Line-Ups
Brighton & Hove Albion (BHA): in-possession 3412 & out-of-possession 3412 (high) / 5212 (mid / low)
Liverpool (LIV): in-possession 433 / 235 & out-of-possession 433
More details on BHA's team's shape, in and out of possession, and general observations below. Note - most interesting aspects of the game were BHA so limited commentary on Liverpool.
Note - error in the line-up and some of the visuals, as Ryan played in goal for BHA and not Sanchez
Brighton & Hove Albion Observations
In-Possession:
In possession, BHA were in a 3412 shape
BHA would predominantly try to play out from the back and build up with patience yet purposeful intent with each player having specific roles
The back three would split across the pitch to increase the distances LIV front three had to cover between them, plus, give BHA more passing angles / options on the next pass e.g. a wide centre back could play up the line or hit a diagonal switch, Dunk as the central defender of the three could play through the centre of the pitch into the double pivot
The wingbacks would hug the touchline and position themselves behind LIV's first line of defence (their front three) but would purposefully not push up against LIV's fullbacks (more on that below)
Groß and Bissouma would play as a double pivot in central midfield and drop towards their centre backs in an attempt to draw up LIV's wide central midfielders
Maupay would drop centrally into the spaces behind were LIV's wide central midfielders had vacated to either receive passes through the lines, try and help create overloads in the centre of the pitch and/or also drag up Wijnaldum from his defensive midfield position
Welbeck and Connolly would position themselves in the spaces between LIV's centre backs fullbacks
One specific BHA tactic in their build up play would be having patient possession between their goalkeeper, centre backs and double pivot to try and shift LIV front three across the pitch in an attempt to eventually find a wide centre back with a bit of time to be able to find a pass out to their wingback
The wingback, who would be hugging the touchline and as mentioned above be positioned behind LIV's first line of defence, would receive the ball in space and then would be expecting and anticipating they would be quickly pressed by a LIV fullback, so in essence drawing them out of position
If, and inevitably when, the LIV fullback did jump out of position to go and press the wingback in possession, the wingback knew their next action was to play an inside square pass to the central midfielder on their side who had already begun to come over towards the wing to support the wingback and then that central midfielder would play a first-time ball into the channel for the forward on that side, who was already making the run into that space to chase and get on the end of the pass
(Remember, in build-up BHA's forwards would position themselves between the LIV centre back and fullback so would be positioned on the outside of LIV's centre back so have an advantage in getting on the end of such passes into the channels)
Below is a (simplistic) visual example of this attacking pattern of play to demonstrate this BHA tactic
Following this move, BHA would either look to cross for runners into the box if a good opportunity was available but were not opposed to holding up the ball and keeping / recycling possession backwards to then have controlled possession in the middle / final third, having shifted LIV's out-of-possession back towards their own goal and into more a mid / low block
This was just one specific tactic BHA tried multiple times throughout the game, on both right and left flanks
BHA could also easily vary this attacking tactic e.g. if the wingback was not pressed by the LIV fullback they could carry the ball upfield themselves, if the wingback could not find a pass into the central midfielder then he might be able to find another pass inside (either to Maupay who was dropping into pockets of space or the forward who had dropped into the half space) or the wingback could play the ball into the channel themselves for the forward to run onto
In middle third and final third possession, BHA tried to overload the wide / half spaces in possession, often using the wide centre back, the wingback, the central midfielder on that side, Maupay and the forward on that side, they would often look to create combinations to try and disrupt LIV's backline to ultimately create space for a forward runner to exploit
The visual below shows the areas BHA would try to overload and create passing combinations in (yellow areas), ultimately to try and work the ball into the red zones of those areas for low crosses or cutbacks into the box
BHA would regularly get numbers into and around the box, in the box would be the two forwards, Maupay, a central midfielder (mainly Groß) and a wingback (mainly March when crossing from the right flank) and around the box would tend to be the other centre midfielder (mainly Bissouma) and the other wingback (mainly Veltman)
Additional observations of BHA in-possession in the middle or final third included their two forwards often dropping short to show for the ball only for this to be a decoy movement to try and drag out a LIV centre back from position and then Maupay would attack that space from his deeper central position, or the other forward would make a diagonal run across to exploit
In the final third, Groß had a variety of attacking movements he would perform for the team - mainly after pushing out wider into the right half space
In this area he would either combine with the wingback for one-twos, put in crosses to the box from a deeper half space position if not being pressed, make underlapping runs into the channel in the final third (as Veltman tended to hold his position at right wing back and not get to the byline as much as March would at left wingback) and also try and combine with the forward with a one-two and run into the box himself
In summary, BHA would always try to build up possession patiently and play through the thirds, and when in the middle third or final third, had various attacking patterns of play (the majority of which would involve overloading the half-spaces) to eventually try and exploit the space behind the LIV backline, ideally in the box / wide areas in the final third of the pitch so able to put in crosses and cutbacks into the box where they tried to get numbers in and around to score
Ultimately, a combination of the aforementioned attacking tactics and movements from BHA were performed in the possession of play which led to them getting a penalty in stoppage time which they scored to level the game 1-1
This included Veltman receiving the ball at right wingback, the forward dropping short to receive a pass into the half space from Veltman and thus pulling out a LIV centre back from his position, the forward laying off to Groß who had pushed up higher in the half space channel, and then Groß laying the ball into the path of the other forward who had made a diagonal run across to exploit the space the centre back had vacated by jumping out
Whilst this resulted in a controversial foul and therefore penalty being given via the VAR, it stemmed from BHA sticking to their attacking principals / tactics even in stoppage time when searching for an equaliser
Out-of-Possession:
Without the ball, BHA's out-of-possession shape was fluid depending on where LIV had the ball on the pitch
If LIV had the ball in their build-up phase, BHA's high block would be a 3412 shape
This shape would be compact and each player (position) had specific roles depending on where the ball was
Ultimately, BHA's aim in their high block was to deny LIV the opportunity to play through the centre of the pitch and force LIV into wider areas where they could use the touchline as an additional defender and apply a more intense press to the opponent on the ball
See the visual below for an example of BHA's 3412 high block shape, with further detail on each player's role below
BHA's forwards would have key roles in their high block - Welbeck and Connolly roles were to angle their press to the LIV centre backs to a) force them out wide to the fullback and b) ensure they did not provide a passing angle through the middle into LIV's central midfielders
Maupay, who would sit on a slightly deeper defensive line to Welbeck and Connolly, was responsible for sitting on Wijnaldum (LIV's midfield pivot) to a) ideally block any passes into him and b) if he did receive the ball, ensuring he didn't have any space to look forward for his next pass so forcing him back towards the LIV goal - in particular, Maupay would try to block any potential passing lanes into Firmino
If BHA's forwards did their job correctly, and forced LIV to passing out wide to their fullbacks on the touchline, this would trigger BHA's next line of defence, their midfield four
The wingback on that side would be primed to push out wider to press the fullback to ideally try and force a turnover but also deny both the opportunity to progress the ball up the pitch via a carry or any time to pick out a (quality) pass, either into the midfield or even a switch - this often resulted in the fullback recycling possession back to their centre back or goalkeeper, but even those players were covered by the BHA forward on that side who was helping squeeze that area of the pitch too
When the fullback could find a pass into the central midfielder inside, that central midfielder would already be under pressure from one of BHA's central midfielder who had squeezed up and over the pitch in anticipation
The whole BHA team would squeeze up and over to the area of the pitch they were pressurising the ball - in situations where this happened, the opposite wingback and wide centre back would both tuck infield a bit more to protect the centre of the pitch so allowing LIV's opposite fullback and wide forward space if they were hugging the opposite touchline
(In the example of the above visual, this would mean if BHA had forced LIV out to Robertson and therefore were squeezing play via their right, then March and Webster would both tuck infield and allow Salah and Williams space on the opposite flank)
When LIV were able to switch play, if for example they found Williams, but his first touch was backwards, then BHA would shift over as a team and begin putting the same pressure on the opposite side of the pitch - maintaining their high block
But, if LIV were able to switch the play, and most importantly progress the ball into the middle or final third e.g. get the ball to Salah, then BHA would execute their low / mid-block out-of-possession shapes, a predominantly 5212 but could switch into a 532 or 442
The trigger for BHA to switch into this shape, which in essence meant their wingbacks dropping on the outside of their back three, would be if LIV were able to progress the ball into the middle or final third of the pitch and/or they were unable to press the ball as a team i.e. be too stretched
BHA's 5212 could also easily become a 532 shape with one of the forwards dropping on the outside of their midfield pivot if LIV had an overload opportunity - see the visual below for an example of when this could occur
As Salah had kept a wide position, he would be able to pin March and prevent him from being able to jump out to go and engage Williams once he received the ball
In addition to this, as Minamino had advanced up higher into the right half space, March was not able to pass on Salah to Webster either, as Webster now had to cover Minamino
Bissouma would a) not want to vacate BHA's central areas, as a risk of allowing LIV an opportunity to create an overload in the midfield, so he could only shuttle across slightly, and b) nor would he be in a position to get out and engage Williams, likely by the time he got across Williams would have had time to already choose and execute his next pass
Therefore, BHA's solution was for the forward on that side, in the example above Connolly, to drop and take up a wide central midfield position
This new, deeper position would allow Connolly to either 1) go and engage Williams on the ball - ideally forcing him back towards the LIV goal, 2) block passing angles infield e.g. into Minamino or Firmino and 3) allow BHA to double up / get bodies to congest the wide areas in case LIV tried to attack down the wing or cut infield
Below is a visual of the 532 shape once the said actions above had occurred - where you can see Maupay would slightly advance from his previous position, but this was mainly to block a passing lane back inside to Wijnaldum and also be in a closer position to press the LIV right centre back if Williams was to play backwards from that position
If LIV did recycle the ball backwards and then begin passing towards the opposite side, and most importantly BHA had time to move across as a unit, the same actions would occur for BHA on the other side e.g. Welbeck would drop into a right central midfield position, Maupay would fill in Welbeck's position and Connolly would revert back to his original forward role
However, in situations where LIV could find / manipulate a direct and quick switch of play to Robertson on BHA's weak side, where BHA did not have time to shuttle across as a unit, BHA would switch to more of a 442 shape
Situations like this could occur if Maupay over covered Wijnaldum (e.g. Wijnaldum advanced slightly to give Phillips more space to receive the ball) and therefore Maupay couldn't get out to the centre back in time which allowed him time to make the diagonal switch to the left flank
As a result, Veltman would push out to engage Roberton, as he would be the nearest player to him
The rest of the BHA backline, including March, would all shift over one and Connolly would temporarily hold his position as a left-sided midfielder - see the visual below for an example of this temporary 442 shape
From this shape, BHA would try to delay LIV's attack and force them to recycle the ball where BHA would then drop back into their main default out-of-possession shape, a 5212
In summary, out-of-possession, BHA had different plans for LIV in the different phases of the pitch and in different scenarios which LIV like to create
These plans (and LIV not being at full strength) all helped limit LIV to six shots and an expected goals total of 0.5 in the game - which was LIV's lowest expected goals of the season in the Premier League so far (their 10th game of the season)
Liverpool Observations
In-Possession:
LIV did not have their usual starting defenders or midfielders playing but they still tried the same attacking patterns and movements when in-possession
During the build-up phase, the full backs would pull wider which allowed LIV's wide central midfielders, Milner and Minamino, to rotate out of their central midfield position onto the outside of the centre backs to get on the ball
Wijnaldum would try to find space between BHA's first defensive line to create a passing angle through the middle but as was being covered by Maupay his main job was more to try and pull Maupay out of position to create passing angles for his teammates
When LIV's wide central midfielders (Milner and Minamino) did rotate backwards to the outside of their centre backs and were in possession of the ball in that area, it meant that the full backs could push up higher on the flank which subsequently meant that the wide forwards, Salah and Jota, could come inside into the half spaces where they could either receive the ball or be closer to goal to make runs in-behind the BHA backline
Firmino would play his usual 'false 9' role and drop short, ideally between the two BHA central midfielders or on the outside of them, to receive the ball through the lines from either a LIV centre back or midfielder
See the visual below which demonstrates the typical movements and positions LIV would take up when in-possession in build up
In middle third and final third possession, LIV's shape would resemble more of a 235 shape with their centre backs always as the two, the three ahead being comprised of Wijnaldum and a combination of either their fullbacks or wide central midfielders and then the front five made up of the front three and then either their fullbacks or wide central midfielders
Examples of LIV's 235 shape and different interchanges of position can be seen visually in the BHA out-of-possession section
Out-of-Possession:
LIV tried their usual high intensity, high pressing and high defensive line when out-of-possession
But as mentioned above, BHA had planned for all of this and due to BHA's comfortability in playing out from the back and building through the thirds, they were able to handle LIV's off-ball strengths and also exploit LIV's main weakness - space in-behind
(Again, it is worth noting that LIV did not have their usual starting defenders or midfielders which I'm sure also contributed to LIV's level with and in this case, without the ball, in this game)
Result
Half-Time = 0-0
Full-Time = 1-1
Thank you for reading.
Stats used in this piece were obtained from fbref.com
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