A 0-0 scoreline at half-time did not begin to tell the real story of the first half. Brighton had enforced their style of play onto Liverpool, despite Jurgen Klopp’s tactical tweaks. The visitors reverted back to type in the second half, but this was still not enough to prevent Roberto De Zerbi’s side going on to complete a deserved 3-0 victory.
This was Roberto De Zerbi’s twelve league game in charge of Brighton; his first being the reverse of this fixture back in October at Anfield which finished 3-3. During this period, the Seagulls had enjoyed more success on the road than at home. Their last league victory at the Amex Stadium was back in October, in a crowd pleasing 4-1 win over former manager Graham Potter’s new side Chelsea.
The home side went into this game without attacker Leandro Trossard who (via his agent) had a public falling out with the Brighton manager. The Italian lined up his side in a 4-4-2 formation, with the versatile Pascal Groß in defense at right back, alongside Lewis Dunk, Levi Colwill and Pervis Estupiñán. Moisés Caicedo and Alexis Mac Allister, in his first start since winning the World Cup, partnered as a double pivot. Solly March and Kaoru Mitoma provided the width and playing, at times, as two false 9s were Adam Lallana and Evan Ferguson.
Liverpool came into the game looking to avoid back-to-back away defeats in the Premier League, following their 3-1 loss to Brentford two-weeks prior. The away side had to compete without striker Darwin Nunez who was out with injury. But this did afford an opportunity for January transfer window signing Cody Gakpo to make his Premier League debut.
Jürgen Klopp partnered the Netherlands international upfront alongside Mo Salah but that was not the most interesting aspect of the German’s selection. The Liverpool manager opted to start the game with a midfield diamond; with Thiago at the tip, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain on the left, Jordan Henderson on the right and Fabinho at the base. Behind this was a back four of Trent Alexander-Arnold, Joël Matip, Ibrahima Konaté and Andy Robertson.
This midfield diamond had implications for Liverpool both in and out of possession in the first half. Before Kiopp decided to change formation at half-time, admitting in his post-match interview that his tactical decision “didn’t work out.”
KLOPP'S TACTICAL TWEAK
Liverpool’s tactical tweak was in clear anticipation of Brighton’s in possession approach, in their own and middle thirds. In these phases of play, De Zerbi likes to position his center-backs, fullbacks and double pivot deep, and patiently buildup possession, including regular use of the goalkeeper, to provoke the opposition into pressing. Then, following an attempt to press, execute a variety of rehearsed passing combinations and movements to bypass the first lines of defense through central areas, and then ultimately, attack the spaces ahead using their forward line.
It was likely with this in mind that Klopp, and his staff, decided upon the rationale to start the game with a midfield diamond. The idea appeared to be that this shape allowed them to position a midfielder in close proximity to the Brighton double pivot - a key component of Brighton’s buildup.
Thiago, at the tip of the diamond, worked in tandem with the forward line (Salah and Gakpo), to engage the base of Brighton’s in possession formation. Salah and Gakpo positioned themselves in front of a Brighton center-back but also tried to use their cover shadow to block passes into the double pivot. Then Thiago would engage whichever of the double pivot made a movement towards the ball.
Due to a midfield diamond's obvious lack of width, Liverpool had different solutions in their high and medium blocks to engage the hosts' fullbacks. In their high block, Alexander-Arnold pushed up and out of the defensive line so he was able to engage any passes out to Estupiñán, with Oxlade-Chamberlain covering Groß. However, this tactic often left Liverpool with a backline of three versus at least three Brighton attackers.
Liverpool high block shape when Brighton had possession in their own third.
Brighton’s wingers, March and Mitoma, positioned themselves up against and on the outside of the Liverpool defensive line when their team was in possession. And in central areas, the two false 9s, Lallana and Ferguson, each took up various positions. Lallana would predominantly be the one to drop deeper, on the blindside of Fabinho or Henderson, to offer additional passing angles and create numerical overloads in buildup. Whereas Ferguson tended to push up higher to occupy the two Liverpool center-backs and make runs in behind.
In the opening forty-five minutes, the hosts regularly played through the Liverpool high press and found Mitoma in space on the left flank. The Japanese winger would then carry the ball forward at speed to attack his opponent one-v-one. Or, after dragging the Liverpool backline over towards his side, switch the point of attack to March who would either be positioned in space on the opposite flank or making a diagonal out-to-in run in behind, and between, Konaté and Robertson.
In Liverppol’s medium block, Alexander-Arnold stayed in the defensive line and it was Henderson’s task to get out to Estupiñán when he received the ball. This caused Liverpool multiple issues. Firstly, Brighton were regularly able to play through the Liverpool press, and due to the narrowness of their midfield, Estupiñán was always an out-ball. Secondly, when the Ecuadorian fullback did receive the ball he was able to carry possession into the Liverpool half relatively unopposed. And thirdly, it forced Henderson to vacate central areas which allowed Lallana and Ferguson to drop into pockets of space, on the blindside of Fabinho.
8th minute: possession sequence from Brighton. Here, Colwill drops deeper to receive a pass from Dunk which pulls Salah higher, Caicedo then drops to make an angle for the next pass which he receives before playing a first-time pass out wide to Estupiñán in space on the left flank who is then able carry the ball into the Liverpool half unopposed. This sequence concludes with a shot from March inside the area which gets cleared by Alexander-Arnold.
In middle third possession, the Brighton false 9s and wingers often made simultaneous opposite movements. When either Lallana or Ferguson dropped short between-the-lines - and consequently dragged up a Liverpool center-back with them - the near-side winger would respond by making a diagonal out-to-in run behind. This specific attacking tactic helped lead to Brighton’s highest quality chance of the first-half (0.13 xG, source FBREF) when Mitoma was put through on the goal, only having Alison to beat, but poked the ball wide.
The story of the first half was Brighton having deep and middle third possession; and constantly finding solutions to exploit Liverpool’s high and medium blocks. Despite 64% possession (source: Whoscored.com) and six attempts on goal, the hosts had nothing to show for their dominance. From Liverpool’s perspective, Klopp’s decision to play a midfield diamond seemed to frequently backfire with the home side not only seizing control but also regularly navigating the gaps in the visitors' formation to initiate constant, and varied, attacking patterns of play.
BRIGHTON GET THEIR REWARDS
At half-time, Liverpool reverted back to their usual 4-3-3 formation, both in and out possession. But after two minutes of the restart, the home side were ahead. The goal came from another feature of Brighton’s play; their wingers making vertical forward runs following a turnover in possession, forcing the Liverpool defensive line backwards and creating space in front to play.
In the 46th minute, Liverpool had relatively comfortable possession in their own third but a sudden press from Ferguson forced Matip into giving away possession which Mac Allister seized upon. The Argentinian quickly found Lallana who then flicked the ball first-time into the path of an incoming Mitoma who managed to divert the ball towards the far post where March was also charging into the box to tap the ball in.
By the 53rd minute, Brighton had made it 2-0 to put the game all but beyond a despondent Liverpool. The goal came about in pretty much similar fashion to the first. Following some turnovers in possession, Ferguson’s pressure on Matip forced him into another giveaway. The ball landed with Estupiñán and right on the cue, both Mitoma and March set off on their forward runs towards the Liverpool backline. This movement allowed Ferguson - who made an opposite movement towards the ball - to receive a pass from his teammate before carrying the ball into space and playing a through ball into March who was making a diagonal out-to-in run behind. After controlling and setting himself, the winger clinically shot across Alison and nestled the ball into the side netting.
Despite there being over a third of the game left to play, Brighton controlled the remainder of the match, both with and without the ball. In the 81st minute, substitute Danny Welbeck put the icing on the proverbial cake with a sublime goal to make it 3-0 following some slack defending from Liverpool at a throw-in.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
Brighton’s convincing victory over Liverpool was much more than just a statement win against one of the Premier League’s ‘big six’. It was also evidence of the progress the home side are making under Roberto De Zerbi. Not only showcasing their understanding of the Italian’s much revered style of play but the effectiveness of it when executed well.
Jurgen Klopp’s decision to deploy specific tactics against Brighton not only backfired but it also showed the current state of affairs at both club’s at this halfway stage of the Premier League campaign. One side flourishing under a clear identity and the other struggling to reinvigorate their own. This result left Brighton two places and two points above their opponents in the race for the European places; but it will be the performance of each side which may be the best indication as to how they may fare in the second half of the season.
Thank you for reading this tactical story.
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