Man City's visit to Stamford Bridge in the Premier League this past week (05.01.23) caused much conversation and debate. This was not only post-game, with the usual football tactics community actively hypothesising reasons for Pep Guardiola's (and staff's) decisions, but also during the game, with Jamie Carragher acknowledging how Man City were switching formations with and without the ball early on, and then trying to decipher the reasons why live on air (which I personally, fully welcome).
But much of the in-game and post-match observations, and analysis, has focused on what Man City were doing. And to date, I've seen little reference as to what Chelsea were doing - who, like the rest of us, were probably surprised, not at how Man City were playing, but how they were forming their usual structures, with and without the ball. However, unlike the rest of us, Chelsea were having to not only figure this out, but also come up with, and execute, solutions offensively and defensively in real-time.
And it is those defensive solutions I want to focus upon in this post. Not jut because it's something I haven't seen much coverage of, but because to my eye, they were both interesting and the reasons Chelsea were able to help contain Man City for large parts of the game, but also, following a slight tweak in the second half, is what contributed to costing them in the lead up to Man City's first, and ultimately, winning goal.
But before we get into that, let's firstly quickly see how both team's set-up...
Team's Set-Up
Kicking off with the away side, in the first half, as mentioned, Man City switched formations with and without the ball. Watch the animation below to see what Man City did, and how.
To quickly summarise the key tactics on a basic level (as there's been some great detailed pieces on this published already across the football tactics community)...
Out of possession, Man City predominantly got into a 442 defensive structure with De Bruyne and Haaland, their first line of defence, taking it in turns to pivot off the Chelsea central midfielders whilst the other went to engage the Chelsea centre back on on the ball, when on their half of the pitch. The most interesting aspect of this defensive structure though was Rodri dropping from midfield into the backline as a left-sided centre back.
In possession, Man City transitioned into a 325 structure with Rodri pushing up into midfield, leaving a base of three at the back, De Bruyne and Gundogan taking up positions in the right and left half-spaces respectively, and Cancelo and Foden playing high and wide, with Haaland the highest central player.
However, at half-time, after Guardiola decided he got his initially starting XI wrong (his words not mine), Man City made two substitutions, bringing on Lewis for Walker and Akanji for Cancelo. Despite these substitutions, in the second half, Man City's structures, in and out possession, remained the same as the first half.
Watch the animation below to see the difference in the second half. Instead of Rodri playing a hybrid central defender and midfielder role, Lewis became the defender to push into midfield, by inverting from his right fullback defensive position.
From a Chelsea point of view, in possession they predominantly played in a 4231 / 424 shape. (Note - the use of the word shape over structure is intentional, as Chelsea were relatively fluid with the ball, especially in their forward line).
Watch the animation below to see how Chelsea transitioned their shape in possession depending of the phase of play.
In essence, when Chelsea were in possession their two central defenders provided the base, being the deepest players, often splitting wide to increase the distances Man City had to cover without the ball. Their fullbacks played very wide, and seemed to have no restrictions on the vertical lines they played / could attack on - often working in tandem with the wide forward ahead of them - and both getting high up the pitch when Chelsea were attacking the final third. Zakaria and Kovacic played as a double pivot and then ahead of them, there were four forward players.
The make-up of these four players changed drastically throughout the game, due to injuries and substitutions, but in essence there were two 'wider forwards' who could occupy both the flanks and inside channels and then two more central forwards, with one dropping short between-the-lines, often in between and in behind the Man City two central midfielders, and the other positioned on the opposition defensive line to try and occupy / pin them back.
Right, now that's (very briefly) covered, let's move on to the main focus of this piece, Chelsea out of possession.
Chelsea Out of Possession (1st Half)
Whereas Man City were hybrid in possession, Chelsea were hybrid out of possession, with their defensive shape, and player responsibilities, varying depending on the phase of play.
When Man City had specific types of possession in their own third, for example from goal kicks or following a backwards pass, Chelsea would actively try to pressurise the ball using a 4231 high block.
Some brief observations of this high block were; the first two lines of defence (the single high forward with three in behind) would aim to engage Man City's backline, squeezing across the pitch to cut off the other side. The central player of the three players in the second line of defence, would ensure he stayed close to Man City's double pivot and would be supported with one of the wider players coming infield to help cover. Behind this, the Chelsea double pivot would cover Man City's midfield 8s (De Bruyne and Gundogan), their fullbacks would jump up if Man City's wide forwards dropped deeper and this left their two central defenders with Haaland.
However, this high block / press was only used on certain occasions, with Chelsea predominantly dropping (and being forced) into a mid-block when Man City had the ball in the middle third, and then subsequently a low block when defending their own third / area.
Chelsea's mid-block, the most interesting aspect of their out of possession set up (to me at least), varied between a 442 and what, at times, resembled an asymmetrical 433. Their low block followed a similar theme, but with the whole team dropping deep, to help defend their area.
In the image below, taken from the 2nd minute, you can see Man City's 325 in possession structure highlighted in sky blue. You can also see the staggered positioning of Chelsea's six players in front of their back four (all highlighted in darker blue with name tags).
On initial observation, this defensive positioning could have just been perceived as the game taking the shape in the opening stages. However, as the below additional examples will demonstrate, it was a clear early indication of Chelsea's tactics, and specific player responsibilities, without the ball in this phase of play.
Before showcasing these mid-block examples in reality, here's an overview of the predominant roles of their players, regardless of whether the overall team shape was 442 or an asymmetrical 433, or any other labels people would like to give.
Defensive Line (back 4): as you would generally expect, the central defenders were covering Haaland, with either able to follow up him up the pitch if he dropped short to receive a pass. Completing the back four, were the fullbacks, who would cover Man City's wide players, but they also at times may have to leave the wide player, if an opponent (mainly De Bruyne or Gundogan) were free in the half-spaces.
Midfield and Forward Lines: now this where things got a little more fluid and interchangeable for Chelsea, as each of their six remaining outfield players had both, general defensive responsibilities and also, specific opponents to cover. To list these out:
Zakaria: in addition to covering his general right-sided central midfield area, and blocking passing lanes into Gundogan in the left half-space, he was also tasked with jumping up to Rodri when he received the ball
Kovacic: in addition to covering his general left-sided central midfield area, he was also tasked with keeping an eye on De Bruyne, both by trying to block passes into him and directly tracking him if he pulled wide for example
Ziyech: in addition to covering his general right-sided midfield area and supporting Azpilicueta at right fullback, he was also tasked with keeping an eye on Gundogan, this resulted in Ziyech tending to be positioned a lot narrower and deeper compared to Chelsea's left-sided midfielder, and as a result, helped give their mid-block the asymmetrical 433 shape
Pulisic (and then Chukwuemeka): in addition to covering his general left-sided midfield area and supporting Cucurella at left fullback, he was also tasked with 1) jumping up to engage Walker when he had the ball and 2) tucking in on Bernardo Silva when Havertz jumped up to engage Stones - this tucking in, would have also likely had a benefit of helping close off any new potential passing lanes into De Bruyne in the right-half space
Havertz: initially seemed to prioritise collapsing back onto Bernardo Silva, blocking passing opportunities into him, but then also had the task of jumping up to engage Stones when on the ball, to ensure Man City faced some opposition - but importantly when Havertz did jump up, off Bernardo SIlva, he intentionally tried to use his cover shadow to block any passing angles into him. But as mentioned, he was also supported / covered in this task with the left-sided midfielder tucking in to get nearer Bernardo Silva when he did release
Sterling (and then Aubameyang): main priority seemed to be to cover Ake, so often positioned slightly wider (again, added to the resemblance of a asymmetrical 433) - and also, supported in central areas e.g. pulling in onto a double pivot if free or pushing up onto Stones
Having written all of the above, due to footballs constant fluid and dynamic state - let alone Man City's positional interchanges and off-ball movements to lose markers and find / create space - the above was by no means the Chelsea players only responsibilities without the ball.
Out of possession, the Chelsea players, and team, were constantly having to readjust and adapt defensively. They themselves would often have to interchange, be required to switch roles and pass players on to deal with Man City offensively.
These weren't the only examples of this readjusting and adapting, but to highlight the most common;
On the Chelsea right-hand side, Ziyech could push out wider to engage Ake, which meant that Aubameyang would drop on Rodri, and then Zakaria would be tasked with covering Gundogan.
In central areas, Havertz - whilst predominantly tasked with covering Bernardo Silva - could also push on to Rodri, if the situation required. For example, if Man City were playing out via their left-hand side and teammates had shifted over to engage the ball.
On the Chelsea left-hand side, if Kovacic could not leave his central midfield area e.g. a Man City player was carrying the ball forward into his 'zone', then Cucurella would be primed to come inside to pick up De Bruyne and then the left-sided midfielder would be required to drop deeper to help get out to Cancelo, if needed.
Now to showcase all of the above in reality, scroll through the below match screengrab examples to see Chelsea's hybrid out of possession approach during the first half.
In this first example below from the 11th minute, Chelsea are in a 442 shape. The action before this screengrab involved Gundogan drifting over from his usual left half-space to the right half of the pitch which helped temporarily pre-occupy Kovacic, and resulted in Kovacic having to pass De Bruyne onto Cucurella. Cucurella, then in turn had to leave Cancelo (out of shot) on the right flank, thus leaving him free (in space).
This type of action from Man City is a good example of how they tried to manufacture disruption in the Chelsea defensive set-up, to ultimately create space. The action following the screengrab above involved Stones playing a pass out to Cancelo who is now in space on the right wing (see how De Bruyne, circled, is pointing to where the pass should go) and from a Chelsea point-of-view, results in Pulisic having to drop deeper, on the outside of Cucurella to engage. One final observation on this image is that you can see Kovacic is already making a movement to get back over to help get near De Bruyne.
In this second example from the 14th minute, Chelsea are in their asymmetrical 433. Each player is 'locked' on their designated opponent (see arrows to depict their roles).
To describe each of these;
Aubameyang is slightly wider right in the forward line to cover Ake but he's also still able to support centrally, which he does in this sequence by coming inside to engage Stones on the ball
Havertz has dropped deeper nearer Bernardo Silva and is able to use his cover shadow to block passes into him, but is also primed to jump up to Stones if needed
Pulisic is positioned on this forward line as he's primed to get out to Walker (out of shot) if needs be, or come inside to cover Bernardo Silva if required
Zakaria has jumped up from the midfield line to close down Rodri
Ziyech is deeper and narrower to cover the left-sided midfield 8 for Man City, who in this action is De Bruyne, following another switch of the sides between him and Gundogan
Kovacic is therefore having to cover Gundogan, note how he's been pulled wider to ensure there's no 'easy' passing lane into the German international
The back four are where you would expect, Cucurella, the only player out of shot, has slightly tucked in at left fullback to avoid leaving too much of a gap between himself and Koulibaly
The action following the above screengrab resulted in Man City again working the ball out to Cancelo in space on the right wing. In a good example of Chelsea having to adjust and adapt, in this situation, due to their players positioning, Cucurella pushes out wide to engage Cancelo which, in the classic Man City fashion was a trigger for their midfield 8 to try and exploit the space by making a run between, and beyond, the opposition fullback and centre back, which Gundogan does and this requires Kovacic to sprint back to try and cover / get goal side. Despite Gundogan being able to receive the ball in the area, his low cross is cut out by Kepa.
In the next example, there are three screengrabs which were all taken within a minute of each other (between 29-30 minute mark). In these images, you can see aspects of nearly all Chelsea's out of possession tactics - their hybrid shape, their designated player roles and having to adjust and adapt to the situation in-hand.
In this first image below, Chelsea are adjusting to the Man City players positioning. They are therefore at this moment, appearing in a 442 shape. But, as depicted by the arrows, you can see each player is ensuring they fulfil their specific role for the team; Aubameyang out to Ake, Havertz covering Bernardo Silva but also able to push up to Stones, Zakaria edging closer to Rodri, Ziyech deeper and narrow to cover Gundogan and Chukwuemeka (now on for Pulisic) covering Walker but also able to push inside to Bernardo Silva if needs be.
In the next image below, you can now see Chelsea defending in more of a 433 shape (granted this scenario is less asymmetrical). Due to Man City players interchanging - Rodri and Bernardo Silva rotating, Gundogan roaming more centrally between-the-lines, and De Bruyne pushed up onto the Chelsea last line - Chelsea are having to adjust in real-time.
In the final image of this sequence below, no lines have been added to Chelsea's set-up as the players are reacting and adapting to the situation. In this sequence, Man City have again worked the ball over to Cancelo on the right wing which has pulled Cucurella out with him. On this occasion, Kovacic is already covering De Bruyne, but he's not the threat, it's Rodri (circled) who at this period in the game was roaming from his usual position to disrupt Chelsea's defensive tactics to try and exploit spaces he helped manufacture. In this scenario he makes a run between and beyond the Chelsea backline which Cancelo picks out, however, in a good example of Chelsea's team ethic without the ball, Havertz retreats back to track his run. Despite Rodri receiving a pass in the area, Chelsea are able to get bodies back and Man City end up recycling possession backwards.
In the next example below, in the 36th minute, you can see how Chelsea are not necessarily in a specific shape but how their players are following their specific roles. Aubameyang is getting out to Ake, Zakaria has pushed up to Rodri, Havertz is covering central areas as Stones had just been on the ball, so therefore Chukwuemeka has come inside to cover Bernardo Silva. Then covering the two Man City midfield 8s are Ziyech on Gundogan and Kovacic who is in close proximity to De Bruyne.
Between the 30th minute mark and half-time, Man City had their most dominant spell of possession in the first half. According to whoscored.com, during this period Man City had 67% of the ball, compared to 59% possession between 0-15 minutes and 33% between 15-30 minutes.
During this timeframe, Man City were beginning to execute more positional interchanges and player off-ball movements to disrupt Chelsea defensively. In this spell, Man City also created their highest xG chance (0.20 according to FBRef.com) of the half.
The three below screengrabs show the build up to this chance and how Man City were able to manufacture this opening by exploiting Chelsea's out of possession tactics.
In the first image below, note initially how De Bruyne and Gundogan have swapped sides. This in addition to City's spell of possession has disjointed the Chelsea players - see how Cucurella has been dragged up the pitch by Cancelo, Kovacic has had to jump up as he sees Bernardo Silva in space - therefore he temporarily needs to pass on one of City's midfield 8s, and also spot how Zakaria is beginning to move up field presumably to try and get nearer Rodri, perhaps following an instruction from Thiago Silva behind who is pointing in that direction.
In the next image below, the action picks up with Chelsea having managed to get into a 433 shape but Zakaria has (understandably) not got out to Rodri in time as such a large distance to cover. He therefore now knows he needs to adjust, and instead focus on blocking any passes through the lines into the half-spaces (where typically a Man City player is positioned). However, note how both De Bruyne and Gundogan are more central, and also relatively free - especially Gundogan, between the Chelsea midfield and defensive lines - you can even see Haaland pointing to this fact.
Rodri is therefore able to find a pass through the lines into Gundogan, where in the image below you can see he receives on the half-turn and then following a pull out onto the outside of Koulibaly from Haaland, he plays a pass in behind which Haaland controls in the box before shooting wide (preferring to use his favoured left foot as opposed to his right which the angle would have suited more).
Now the examples in the sequence above were not necessarily to point the blame at any one Chelsea player or their defensive set-up. A number of factors went into this chance being created, starting with Man City disjointing the Chelsea defensive shape and player roles. Zakaria chose to block a passing angle on his right-hand side into Gundogan (his priority), which allowed more space to his left for a pass into Gundogan, where Kovacic had not been able to get back in time to cover. And then in addition to this, Cucurella, having being pulled out wide initially, had not got back in time to cover on the outside of Koulibaly.
To an extent, some may say Chelsea got away with this opportunity. But when you face an opponent with the quality of Manchester City, it's highly likely you'll eventually concede chances. It's therefore more about restricting and limiting the volume and quality of chances, of which Chelsea did well at in the first. Both in respects to their overall team set-up and player roles, but also, their ability to adjust and adapt to the situation in hand.
In a final example of Chelsea players being aware of their multiple responsibilities out of possession (plus, adjusting and adapting), and to show their low block in reality, see the three screengrabs below all taken from the 45th minute.
In this first image, Chelsea are in a sort of 442 shape. Ziyech is narrow as he was covering Gundogan - who is beginning to swap sides with De Bruyne, Zakaria and Kovacic are covering central areas - aware of the pending Man City midfield 8 switch, Chukwuemeka is positioned on a higher horizontal line than the rest of the midfield as he is covering Bernardo Silva, as Havertz had moved up to engage Stones, and Aubameyang has pulled more centrally as a result of City's possession on their right-hand side (Chelsea's left). As depicted by the light blue arrows, after this possession on their right-hand side, Rodri is looking to switch to left with Ake able to advance ahead into space.
In the next image below, you can see Chelsea's reaction to this with Ziyech pushing up to Ake, which leaves Zakaria to pick up the left-sided 8 (at this point De Bruyne) and Kovacic to cover the right-sided 8 (at this point Gundogan). You can even see Chukwuemeka beginning to drop deeper to cover on the outside of Kovacic.
In the final image of this sequence below, Chelsea are now in their predominant low block shape where they have all 10 outfield players back, with Aubameyang and Havertz collapsing too. Whilst this attack did lead to an attempt on goal, it's another good example of Chelsea's defensive tactics.
That's the first-half covered then. Now time to look at what happened in the second half...
Chelsea Out of Possession (2nd Half)
In the second half, as mentioned, Man City changed personnel which, whilst did not alter their in possession structure, did change how they formed it, with Lewis now becoming the hybrid defender and midfielder, instead of Rodri.
For the first 5 minutes of the second half, Chelsea continued with the same defensive tactics as in the first half. But after this, as a result of the Man City changes, Chelsea made some tweaks to their players individual defensive responsibilities. As a consequence, this also impacted upon the overall team's out of possession shape.
The below image was taken from the first 20 seconds of the second half and, as you can see, Chelsea players are executing the same defensive actions as per the first-half. Zakaria has charged up the pitch to engage Rodri, Ziyech has dropped deeper and tucked in on Gundogan, Kovacic is moving out to get near De Bruyne, Aubameyang is near Ake and Havertz and Chukwuemeka are both close to the right-sided central midfielder (now Rico Lewis), but Chukwuemeka is beginning to push out to his man in the City back three base (now Stones), as he has the ball.
Here's another example in the 53rd minute. In the image below you can see similar defensive actions from the Chelsea players, with Zakaria literally having just pushed Rodri after he had played a pass out wide right to Stones. (You can ignore the defensive lines shown in this image, they've mainly been added just to show how high Zakaria has pushed up from his initial central midfield position).
Whilst not the direct conclusion of the above attack, shortly after this passage of the play, Man City have possession in the final third. And on this occasion, as you can see in the image below, Ziyech has come inside to get near Rodri and Zakaria is picking up Gundogan (nearest City player to Zakaria), who you can see is making a movement to receive a pass in the left half-space.
On first glance, this was initially put down to how the attack versus defence situation had materialised. There was nothing more to it. However, as the following examples will demonstrate, it was in fact the first sign of Chelsea's tweak to their players individual defensive responsibilities, and therefore, consequently, out of possession set-up.
Here's the first of a few examples which demonstrates this tactical tweak. Note, in these images you won't see any lines to show Chelsea's defensive lines apart from the back four. That's because, 1) their structure was still a mixture of a 4231 high block and then a 442 / 433 mid-block - but with Ziyech's new, more central position, it gave their whole 'asymmetrical' shape another dimension, and 2) the label of this out of possession structure doesn't really matter, it's the positions / roles that the Chelsea players took up without that ball which were important.
In the image below, in the 57th minute you can see Ziyech pushed up and onto Rodri, a change to his first half role of sitting deeper and narrow to cover Gundogan.
As that play develops on the City right-hand side (see image below), despite Ziyech initially beginning to drop back to his right-sided midfield position - as he can see that Stones (on the ball by Havertz) has a pass into Rodri - he begins to make a movement inside to engage him. This means he's passing on Gundogan to Zakaria but as you can see, the Swiss player is currently occupied in his general right-sided central midfield area, and he can't simply vacate this central area immediately, as this would allow for vertical passing lane into Haaland or De Bruyne, who is currently positioned on the inside of Kovacic (I suspect intentionally to purposefully give Zakaria an issue). This means that Gundogan (circled) is currently unattended in the left-half space.
This scenario happened again in the 59th minute, as you can see below. Ziyech has again come inside to engage Rodri when in possession and this time, as Haaland has caught Zakaria's attention by dropping short between the Chelsea double pivot, he again can't simply vacate his position which again leaves Gundogan (circled) unattended in the left-half space.
Rodri actually decided not to make the pass into Gundogan on this occasion, and instead switched play to the right wing where Bernardo Silva carried the ball to the byline and cut back for De Bruyne on the edge of the box who fired wide. In the image below, you can see that De Bruyne is about to receive the pass (granted he's in too much space to) and you can also see Gundogan (circled) still unattended, as Ziyech has not dropped back, instead staying near to Rodri.
A minute later, in the 60th minute, in the space of 8 seconds, you can again see in the two images below this issue recurring. In the first image, Ziyech was initially positioned near Rodri but from that higher position he has then pushed up to engage Akanji on the ball. Not necessarily a problem, as you can see Havertz has dropped onto Rodri and Zakaria has Gundogan in his sights.
The problem for Chelsea comes when, following some combination play from Man City on their right-hand side, it pre-occupied / drew Chelsea players over to the ball, which leaves Gundogan (circled) free again, completely unattended in the left half-space. In addition to this, another problem has identified itself (at least for the first-time visually in these examples), Man City have a 2v1 on their left flank with Azpilicueta up against both Gundogan and Grealish (also circled), holding a high and wide left position.
Despite this scenario occurring multiple times in the previous 10 minutes, again in the 61st minute, as you can see below, Ziyech - as clearly instructed to - begins to move inside when he sees a potential opportunity for Rodri to receive the ball. But as in the previous scenarios, Zakaria is unable to vacate his position, especially with De Bruyne inside. (See why I think KDB was making this movement on purpose now...)
Gundogan (highlighted) actually receives the ball from Rodri in this sequence and then has two options; 1) play a pass in behind for Haaland (circled), who is already making the run or 2) play a pass out wide to Grealish (out of shot), who as you can see via Azpilicueta's narrow positioning, is in lots of space wide left. Gundogan chooses option 1 but the pass is under hit and gets cut out by Thiago Silva.
In the passage of play before the Man City goal, the same scenario occurs again but this time with different players. In the image below, Ziyech has pushed inside onto Rodri who has just passed the ball out to Stones, in an advanced inside right position. Gundogan and De Bruyne have again switched sides so Kovacic and Zakaria need to adjust.
Whilst the possession sequence in the image above fizzled out on the right wing, eventually getting cleared back up the pitch and subsequently ending up with Ederson, even though he had no involvement in the play, note how De Bruyne has found space in that left inside channel.
It's a pocket of space that Ziyech keeps vacting, is on the outside of Zakaria and in behind Aubameyang. And as the preceding examples have been alluding to, this vacated left-half space was a contributing factor (amongst other things) in City breaking the deadlock.
As highlighted in the above example, the clearance from the previous attacking passage eventually found it's way back to Ederson. And as a result, presumably a trigger for Chelsea's high press, Ziyech sprinted up to engage him. However, the rest of the Chelsea team were not in great positions to support, and as Graham Potter referenced after the game, he thought this press was a mistake, as it left them exposed and easy to play through which Man City did (see blue arrows for how they played out and through in the image below).
Following this build up, the ball gets passed up the City right-hand side to Lewis, who then carries the ball further up field, as he has space ahead of him to advance into. This carrying of the ball has the effect of drawing Chelsea players over to that side of the pitch and therefore, frees up the space on the left-hand side. See De Bruyne and Grealish, both circled, already positioned in lots of space.
Another observation in the image above is Haaland's run in behind. I've no doubt the striker makes this run as he actually wants the ball played in behind - and the passing option is there. But I also, after seeing it become a recurring pattern in other games, think he makes that run as it has the dual benefit of also helping the team create space. His run in behind drags the Chelsea backline deeper, and as a result he therefore helps create more space for Man City to advance / play in to. Anyway, back to the action...
In the penultimate image below, see how De Bruyne is completely unattended in the left half-space and Grealish is, as usual, high and wide left. This helps creates a 2v1 opportunity against Azpilicueta. Man City begin to work the ball over to this left-hand side into De Bruyne's path.
Once he receives the ball in the left half-space, De Bruyne has a simple pass into Grealish's path who is free out wide, and then Grealish plays a first-time low-cross / pass towards the far post where an incoming Mahrez is attacking, and then he taps in to score and put Man City into a 1-0 lead.
Not referenced in the detail above is 1) Cucurella allowing Mahrez to get ahead of him at the far post (something Jamie Carragher was quite strong about on commentary) and 2) Kepa seemingly allowing the ball to cross his path when it appeared to be at a distance and pace that he would (should) be able to claim.
Granted these factors played a part in the goal. The ratio of contribution...I'd have no idea. But what I am sure about is that Chelsea's out of possession tweak - to push Ziyech onto Rodri - as a result opened up the left half-space for Man City to exploit. And even though it took them over 18 minutes in the second half to actually make it count (along with the other aforementioned factors / mistakes which led to this goal), there were plenty of examples of this 'vacant left half-space' pattern emerging, and becoming an issue for Chelsea.
My take on the rationale behind this out of possession tweak for Chelsea is that due to the way the game was panning out - Man City were dominant in the first five minutes of the second half, pretty much camped in the Chelsea half for the entirety and therefore Rodri was having a big influence - Chelsea wanted to stop Zakaria vacating his central midfield position so often. So instead, Chelsea chose Ziyech to push in onto Rodri and allowed Zakaria to stay in position.
The end of first half may have had a factor in this decision too, with how Man City were looking to manufacture situations to exploit the space Zakaria vacated by using Gundogan and De Bruyne moving from the half-spaces into central areas. However, this theory holds up less when you consider Chelsea started the second half period the same as the first.
Maybe it was in fact an attacking solution with Potter wanting Ziyech higher up the pitch to help out more with potential attacking transitions. Or perhaps, simply Ziyech was supposed to do a better job of blocking passing lanes into the left-half space when closing down Rodri. Or Zakaria needed to commit more to covering Gundogan. Or even, Man City just recognised the Chelsea tweak and found a way to exploit it. Perhaps all of the above and then some more.
We'll unfortunately never know. But what I do know is, this tweak was a major contributing factor in Man City building sustained pressure, and attacks, between 45-60 minutes and then eventually scoring in the 63rd. In this spell of dominance, Man City had five attempts on goal which equaled their total tally for the whole of the first half.
The decision to choose Ziyech to cover Rodri, especially because of the resulting gaps it caused, also seems strange when there were, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, seemingly better alternate solutions. The first of these being, Havertz sat on Rodri and Aubameyang taking his role of covering Akanji and pivoting off Lewis. Then Ziyech could have dropped into the right-hand side of midfield line and helped both Zakaria and Azpilicueta to cover this left half-space and then also jumped up to Ake when he was on the ball (a near replica of his defensive role in the first half). The second solution is actually what Chelsea ended up doing - changing their defensive structure and bringing on players who were more suited to it.
Following the goal, Chelsea actually grew back into the match, with longer spells of possession. From the 65th minute until full-time, Chelsea had 67% possession, compared to 30% prior to conceding (according to Whoscored.com). Granted the game state is likely to have had an impact here with Man City more content at protecting their lead. But another factor was that on the 68th minute Chelsea made a triple substitution, bringing on young, energetic players Gallagher, Hall and Hutchinson, for Aubameyang, Cucurella and Ziyech.
In addition to the personnel changes, Chelsea seemed to, from this point, commit to a 4231 out of possession structure, with Gallagher more permanently based in central areas to get near Rodri (and lots of other Man City players too). Then the wider players could help both cover centrally and drop back to support the double pivot and fullbacks. This was a lot more of what would be considered a traditional 4231 out of possession structure, that collapsed into a 442 / 4411 lower block. Less of the hybrid structure and specific man-orientated responsibilities.
This new set-up without the ball helped Chelsea prevent the previous gaps in the half-spaces from appearing (at least as easily and frequently). And this, coupled with the youthful energy now in their forward lines - mostly led by the rampant Gallagher - helped Chelsea engage Man City higher up the pitch, and force more turnovers and regains. All of this played a part in Chelsea's new, short-spell of dominance in the final 15 minutes of the game.
Ultimately however, despite this improvement both with and without the ball, Chelsea were unable to equalise and the game finished 1-0.
Final Thoughts
To conclude this game's tactical story, in my opinion, Chelsea's hybrid out of possession tactics, and their players individual defensive roles, were a bigger contributing factor in the first half to the relative equalness of the game, as opposed to the narrative of City underperforming and Pep 'overthinking things' with his set-up.
I would argue that the examples shown in this post highlight that Chelsea had a clear plan without the ball, and had prepared solutions for both Man City's in possession structure and usual attacking tactics. And that these were proving to be effective in the first half. And with some better quality final passes and more direct play in attacking transitions, Chelsea could have created more opportunities to score.
But, in the second half, Man City's changes at half-time, initially helped them more without the ball - both via their high press and counterpress being more cohesive and effective - and as a result, it gave City more sustained control of the game. This period of dominance in the opening stages of the second half, led to Man City predominantly being camped in the Chelsea half.
As a result, Chelsea decided to tweak Ziyech's and Zakaria's defensive responsibilities. But in trying to solve one problem, Chelsea's tweak created another. Ziyech vacating his right-sided midfield position resulted in Gundogan (and at times De Bruyne) being unattended in the left half-space which Man City were able to constantly exploit. This flaw in the Chelsea defensive set-up had a direct contribution to Chelsea conceding the first, and ultimately, winning goal.
As Brighton manager, Graham Potter always seemed to be credited more for his innovative and brave tactics in possession, but I think he was underrated for how innovative and brave he was out of possession too. And in the first half, his Chelsea team certainly deployed and displayed some brave, and innovative, tactics without the ball to deal with Man City. And it was working.
But in the second half, unfortunately for Potter and Chelsea, his tweaks out of possession created a problem for the team. One which ultimately ended up contributing to them conceding, and then eventfully losing the game.
Thanks for reading this tactical story.
All stats used in this post were obtained from FBRef and Whoscored.com and game screengrabs were captured from Sky Sports.
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