Line-Ups
Chelsea (CHE): in-possession 3421 (build up) / 325 (final third) & out-of-possession 343 (high) / 4231 (low)
Wolverhampton Wanderers (WOL): in-possession 343 & out-of-possession 523
More details on each team's shape, in and out of possession, and general observations below.
Chelsea Observations
In-Possession:
In-possession, CHE would play a 3421 in build up and then as the ball progressed into the final third, their shape would transition into more of a 325
The back three would remain a constant whatever area of the pitch CHE had the ball
Ahead of them would be a double pivot of Jorginho and Kovacic
In build up, this double pivot would remain narrow in the centre of the pitch to ideally receive passes through the lines from the back three - they would take up positions in-between and in-behind the WOL first line of defence (their front three)
As WOL did not want to allow these passes through the lines into the double pivot, their front three would defend more narrowly to try and avoid allowing these types of passing lanes to open up
This tactic of CHE's double pivot staying narrow in the centre of the pitch had a few benefits - 1) if CHE could find a pass through the lines into one of their central midfielders, then this would likely result in drawing out one of WOL's central midfielders which could then be exploited by either Havertz, Ziyech or Giroud getting into that vacated space to receive the next forward pass, 2) as WOL often prioritised trying to block passing lanes into the double pivot it meant that they could not then also go and press the back three as effectively which therefore gave CHE controlled possession at the back and allowed them to patiently work the ball across the pitch and as a result, tire out the WOL front three, and 3) due to WOL's narrow front three, CHE could find passes into the wider areas for either a wingback or inside forward who had dropped short to receive
CHE's wingbacks, Hudson-Odoi and Chilwell, would advance onto a higher horizontal line than the CHE back three and be more in line with the CHE double pivot (in-behind WOL's first line of defence) but could also drop back towards their back three to receive passes in the aforementioned vacate deeper wide areas
In build up, CHE's wingbacks would not tend to push up right against the WOL last line of defence as they wanted to take a slightly deeper position to try and draw out the WOL's wingbacks if they received the ball
However, the CHE wingbacks could also push up against the backline to pin their opposite wingback if, for example, they wanted to create space for a CHE wide centre back to carry the ball up the pitch
CHE's three forwards would try not to play on the same horizontal line - Giroud played a 'traditional 9' role and Ziyech and Havertz were more inside forwards / two '10's'
Ziyech and Havertz - who would also regularly switch positions - would tend to come short and take up positions in the half spaces to try and receive the ball
They would try to get into pockets of space in-behind and on the blindside (inside or outside) of WOL's central midfielders - and their positions would often result in WOL's wide centre back having to jump out of the backline to go and engage
Giroud would predominantly aim to lead CHE's line and pin Coady back from jumping out to press but could also drop short to offer passes into his feet or chest
Below is a visual example of CHE's shape in build up, including some of the actions detailed above, and also how WOL would try to counteract this with their 523 high block
As CHE progressed the ball up the pitch, their shape would transition into more of a 325 shape with their wingbacks advanced much higher up the pitch
As a result, there was a lot of space in the wide areas in front of WOL's low block - see visual example below with the space being referred to highlighted in yellow
WOL seemed comfortable to allow CHE to have possession in these areas, as it would mainly be CHE's wide centre backs on the ball so preferred to stay in their shape and reduce the amount of space they allowed in-behind
Therefore, whilst CHE had the vast majority of possession throughout the game (79% in total) they mainly had possession in front of WOL's low block, in particular in these sorts of areas
In the first half in particular, CHE did not have many players making runs in-behind the WOL backline so therefore WOL could stay in shape and defend forwards, not worrying about threats in-behind
CHE's only real threat in behind was via dribbles, specifically trying to get Hudson-Odoi to run at Ait-Nouri and beat him in a 1v1 situation to then put a cross into the box - however, as the rest of the WOL defence would be in shape to cover they had a lot of bodies in the box to defend these situations
Even when CHE's inside forwards would pull out into these wider empty spaces to get on the ball, and at times pull out a WOL wide centre from the backline, as CHE did not have regular runners into the spaces behind WOL's backline, they did not exploit any of these openings
However, in the second half, CHE seemed to recognise this issue and therefore tried to create scenarios where they could disrupt WOL's low block shape and then attack the space in-behind it
Two specific examples of these involved the wingbacks and inside forwards rotating positions before a diagonal out-to-in run in-behind
The first example was on CHE's left flank - Kovacic receives possession and simultaneously Chilwell makes a run inside into the left half space and Havertz makes a run out wide towards the touchline (in essence, interchanging positions)
This rotation helps disrupt WOL's out-of-possession shape as Hoever (who has come on as a substitute) gets drawn infield from his right wingback position towards Chilwell and therefore to help cover Havertz out wide, Podence begins to drop deeper on WOL's right hand-side but has a lot of distance to make up to get goal-side
See the visual below for an example of all of these movements which all happen at once
The disruption in WOL's out-of-possession shape has not only forced Podence on the backfoot - both into an unfamiliar position and, as mentioned, not allowing him a lot of time to make up the distance to get goal-side of Havertz - but also it has afforded Kovacic time and space on the ball in the final third (despite Dendonker making a late attempt to get out to him)
Kovacic then plays a one-two with Chilwell and Havertz activates the next stage of the plan, his out-to-in diagonal run in-behind the WOL backline
As a result of the disruption and confusion this positional interchange has caused WOL's low block, Kovacic manages to find a gap in the backline to make pass in-behind for Havert's run who then receives the ball and lays back into Chilwell who shoots but fires over the bar
See the visual below to help demonstrate the passage of play described above - here you can also see the numbers and spread CHE get into the box
Whilst this passage of play did not result in a goal, it was a sign of CHE trying to work possession to get behind WOL's low block
Another example of this occurred on CHE's right flank
As previously mentioned, WOL would often allow CHE's wide centre backs time and space to carry the ball into their own half in wider areas
In this case, Azpilicueta carried the ball forward unopposed and as he progressed, Ziyech and Hudson-Odoi interchanged positions
Hudson-Odoi moved inside into the right half space and Ziyech moved outside towards the touchline
This interchange in positions causes WOL left wingback to initially begin following Hudson-Odoi inside but then he stops and seems to get caught in two-minds as to whether follow Hudson-Odoi inside or stay with Ziyech on the outside
This momentary confusion allows Azpilicueta to find Hudson-Odoi in a pocket of space to receive the ball and then he automatically looks for the next pass which is Ziyech's out-to-in diagonal run in-behind the WOL backline
Again, whilst this passage of play did not result in a goal, it shows how CHE recognised, and managed to execute, opportunities to disrupt and get behind the WOL low block - which, as they sat so deep, invariably meant entries into WOL's box
In summary, CHE tried to patiently build possession through the thirds but in the first half they did not make enough runs in-behind, so WOL only had to defend facing forwards which made it easier for them to them whereas in the second half, CHE worked on situations to disrupt WOL's out-of-possession shape using players interchanging positions and then tried exploit any spaces with runs in-behind
Out-of-Possession:
As mentioned, CHE had 78% possession in the game, so they were not required to defend too much - WOL's main route to attack was via counterattacks from deep
When CHE had possession the final third their three centre backs would be positioned high in WOL's half to help squeeze the pitch
This was so that when there was a turnover in possession, CHE would be in a good position to counter-press and stop counterattacks at source
WOL were limited to just four shots on goal during the goal, generating an expected goals of 0.4 - and their highest quality chance came from a CHE mistake as opposed to an attack generated by WOL
Wolverhampton Wanderers Observations
In-Possession:
WOL only had 12% possession in the game and mainly tried to counterattack CHE from deep using their front three and wingbacks
WOL's main counterattacking tactic was to try and get the ball to Traore or Neto - either directly into them so they could then carry the ball into space themselves or directly into space for one of those players to run into
Another counterattack tactic of WOL was to initially try and find Podence with a pass, as he would come towards the ball in central areas which would be the opposite movement to all other WOL players in transition
The idea presumably being this would either allow Podence time and space on the ball, as CHE defenders may drop off to cover Traore's and Neto's runs, or it would pull out a CHE centre back from the backline if they jumped out to try and engage him - therefore creating more space for Traore or Neto to exploit
Once Podence received the ball, he could then either look to find Traore / Neto into feet or running behind or alternatively pass out wide to a wingback making a forward run up the flank
Out-of-Possession:
As detailed in CHE's in-possession section, when CHE tried to build up possession in their own third, WOL's high block would involve their front three positioning themselves narrower together to try and deny CHE passing lanes through the lines into their double pivot
When WOL did try to engage the ball it would predominantly be when CHE were trying to build up via the flanks
One of WOL's wide forwards would arch their press to force the wide centre back into playing out wide and the wingback on that side would jump up to engage CHE's wingback on that side
When CHE's inside forwards would come short to receive the ball in the half spaces, it was WOL's wide centre backs who would jump out to engage them
When CHE did progress the ball upfield, WOL would get into their low block which was a compact 523 - where they would sit on the edge of their box and allow CHE possession in front of them and focus on denying CHE space in-behind e.g. the box
In this low block, whist WOL's wide forwards would drop deeper to help the team stay compact, it was more WOL's central midfielders who were asked to help support their wingbacks out wide - this appeared to be so WOL's wide forwards could stay slightly higher in case there were opportunities to counterattack
Result
Half-Time = 0-0
Full-Time = 0-0
Thank you for reading.
Stats used in this piece were obtained from fbref.com and infogoal.net
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