Manchester United vs Manchester City - Premier League 22/23 (14.01.23)

The conclusion of yesterday's (14.01.23) Manchester derby was a 2-1 win for United which put them one point behind their city rivals, having both played the same number of games.

The biggest talking point of the game will undoubtedly be Man United's contentious equalising goal.

The story of the game however, to my eye at least, was a battle of tactical plans versus tactical solutions.

And the key aspects from each of these plans and solutions is what this post will focus upon.

Manchester United started the game with a clear tactical plan out of possession and there was a clear theme once in possession. And whilst Manchester City clearly would have prepared, and come into the derby with specific plans, I think the tactical solutions they were finding in real-time were 1) of most interest and 2) had a bigger say on their, and the overall, game.

So let's kick-off with what United had planned...

Manchester United's Tactical Plan

The two biggest aspects of Man United's tactical plan were;

• Out of Possession: using a high-to-mid block, including specific plans for Rodri and each player having specific responsibilities, to disrupt Man City's build up play

• In Possession: in attacking transitions, aim to exploit the spaces behind the Man City backline in the left inside and wide channels (aka Man City's right hand-side)

We'll start with out of possession, as that's mainly how Man United spent the game.

According to Whoscored.com, United had 29% possession across the whole game, with only a slightly higher share in the first half (31%). But United would have expected that coming into the game and more importantly, they had a plan for it. Specifically to disrupt Man City in possession, and even more specifically in their build up play.

Before the game, Manchester United manager Erik ten Hag was asked on BT Sport whether they had any specific plans for Rodri. He responded: ‘Definitely. He is the key player in building up and organising the team.’ Before adding: '...in our defending, we have to be really tight on him and don't give him the space to play because he will set the tempo of the game.'

And that's exactly what Man United did. They deployed Christian Eriksen, as an advanced central midfielder in their 4231 high-to-mid block, to stay in close proximity to the Spanish Man City midfield pivot. In addition to this, United also often tasked their centre forward, Martial, to position himself in front of Rodri to help block direct passing angles into him by using his cover shadow.

Making up the top half of United's block were Rashford (left side) and Fernandes (right side). These players roles were to press the Man City central defenders on the inside, curving their pressing run to try and cut off passing angles to the Man City fullbacks who were wider, on their outside.

Here's an animation which showcases the Man United high-to-mid block.

The plan was to try and limit Rodri's space and time on the ball using Eriksen, but also Martial. Then Rashford's and Fernandes' roles (along with Martial) were to pressure the City central defenders, to ideally win possession in City's first third / half, where they could then attack themselves. Or, failing that, but just as beneficial, disrupt City's build up, rush their passes, make it uncomfortable for them to build any tempo or rhythm to their play. Plus, block central passing lanes.

In addition to this high-to-mid block, and behind these first two lines of defence, United tasked their players with man-orientated responsibilities. Fred and Casemiro had their respective eyes on De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva. The fullbacks would stay in close proximity of the City wide forwards and the two central defenders took it in turns to follow Haaland when he dropped deep, something he was doing a lot of in the first half.

The only Man City players not referenced above were their fullbacks, Walker and Cancelo. And this is because, whilst Rashford and Fernandes were positioning themselves in areas where they could cover both the City central defenders and fullbacks, the priority seemed to be to engage the former. This was a risk and reward strategy, as it meant there these two fullbacks were often the free men for City in their build up - if they could find them - which City gradually started to do, in various different ways which will be covered later on

But as mentioned above, United had planned for not if, but when, City managed to find their fullbacks free in deep build up. In fact they seemed to have two plans.

Firstly, as the City fullbacks were receiving the ball so deep at times, and often initially in the channel, the United wide forwards would make a recovery run back. Yes, this meant City would gain some territory but as the rest of their players were each covered by an opponent, there was time for United to recover and regroup into a mid / low block without causing any major threat.

The second option involved United committing fully to their high block and press with the fullback on that side pushing up to engage the City fullback on the ball. As this meant that the United fullback would have to vacate the opponent he was tasked with covering, in this case a wide forward, the rest of the United defence would all shift over one, so the ball-side central defender would push out onto the temporarily free City wide forward.

Clearly none of the scenarios in the game were as clean or simple to defend than the animation suggests. However, the animation and the descriptions above does help provide an explanation of what United's tactical plan out of possession was. But now, let's see it in reality.

In this first image, you can see in the 2nd minute, this United 4231 high-to-mid block taking shape. See how each player is aware of where their direct opponent is and in close proximity.

Following some possession by Man City, 30 seconds after the first image, below you can see United springing their press with Martial having pushed up to engage Ake and now Rashford sprinting out to Akanji who is about to receive the next pass. Also worth noting how much space Walker and Cancelo (top and bottom of the images, highlighted in blue) are in. Part of United's risk and reward strategy.

In the next image below, this time it's Ferandes springing to press Ake, the central defender on his side.

Five minutes gone on the clock and Man City are struggling to find a direct pass into Rodri, as United have Eriksen tight behind him and Martial in front blocking passes lanes to him. Again, highlighted are the Man City fullbacks in space out wide.

16 minutes into the game and now you can see United's near-full 4231 shape, in more of a mid-block.

A couple minutes later, you can see how Eriksen and Martial were working in tandem on Rodri. At times switching roles.

In the 21st minute, there's a good example below of how from United's mid-block they could spring their press. Rashford is beginning to surge towards Akanji, who is about to receive a pass from Ake. Additional observations in this image are the United double pivot covering the two Man City midfield 8s, and again, Walker being the free man for City, if they can find him.

In the 35th minute, shown below, is an example of 1) Man City lofting a pass over United's forward lines to find Walker in space wide right (not the worst case scenario, as due to it being an aerial ball, the United players will likely have more time to recover) and 2) Malacia having seen Walker free, and about to receive the ball, is making a run up to him, thus leaving Mahrez but knowing Shaw will cover him.

And finally, in the image below, you can see how United started the second half in the same manner. Albeit, in the second half, City improved their passing and solutions so made it more difficult for United out of possession.

Man United's tactical plans of using a 4231 high-to-mid block, trying to restrict use of Rodri, man-orientated responsibilities, and the ability to recover / cover for each other, was a key factor in the first half as to why Man City were limited to just two shots on goal.

And as I will show later in the post, whilst Man City were able to find solutions to begin exploiting this set-up in the first 45, it wasn't until the second half they really started to capitalise on this and cause United issues.

The two below images show Man City's touch map in the first half (left) and the second half (right) with City attacking from right-to-left as you look at both images. Now whilst the inclusion of these is only intended to be indicative, it does clearly show a higher proportion of City touches in their opponents half and the final third in the second half - suggesting United tactics were helping restrict City's usual territorial dominance.

So United's tactical plan out of possession had more of an overall impact in the first half (but also impacted a key moment in the second which I will get onto shortly). But before I do that, let's look at United's tactical plan in possession. This was a lot more simple and easier to spot. But nevertheless just as effective and impactful.

The tactical plan when in possession, well, to be more precise, attacking transitions, was to exploit the spaces behind the Man City backline in the left inside and wide channels (aka Man City's right hand-side).

Whilst not exactly an innovative or unique attacking tactic against Man City, United were clear, and persistent, in executing it. As these examples will showcase.

The first instance came in the 14th minute. Man City were attacking in the final third and manage to get the ball into the United area but it gets cleared before ending up at the feet of Eriksen who immediately looks to make a pass in behind the City backline, in that inside left channel, where Martial is playing his part by making the run.

The next example was not until 34th minute - this may have been because for 10-15 minute spell, Rashford and Fernades swapped sides - but regardless, United were soon back to their plan. Following a loss of possession from De Bruyne, the ball finds its way to Bruno Fernandes, and as you can see, he knows exactly where he wants to pass, with Rashford making the run into the usual in behind space. In this situation, Rashford is greeted by Ederson outside of the area, but despite managing to round the goalkeeper, his subsequent shot gets blocked on the line by Walker.

The next example came about in a slightly different way but with a similar outcome. United play a goal kick out towards the left flank where Fernandes is positioned (side-note, long goal kicks and kicks in general from De Gea were another key feature in United's play). Bruno's presence causes Walker to jump up from his right fullback position which leaves Akanki to deal with Rashford. United find a pass into Rashford who has dropped deeper to help keep the ball in this sequence, the ball gets worked inside and Rashford, having dropped short initially and therefore dragging up Akanji, spins in behind where he is then being chased by Rodri. Eriksen slides a ball into his path but the academy graduate overruns the ball and Ederson is able to smother.

But not to worry, a few minutes later, again following another Man City attack in the final third, United are able to not only clear the danger but find Martial to feet, after he's dropped short to receive and then lay off to Fernandes who...well, you know the drill by now. In this situation Akanji actually gets to the ball first and prevents the danger.

We're now into the second half where the same theme continues. Man City are attacking, United regain possession deep in their own half and once within range, they immediately look for a ball behind into that left inside channel for a runner. In the scenario below, Rashford is out of shot but making the run, and despite Casemiro not really having the space to make this pass, due to the plan, he attempts it anyway but it gets cut out by City.

The below is another example of this pass not being on but United still to execute it. In this situation, Eriksen has the ball on the right touchline but he still attempts to make the pass in behind into that space and Rashford, who you can see in the bottom left corner, is still making that run.

On the 72nd minute, Garnacho came on as a substitute for Eriksen and took up that left forward position with Rashford moving to become the centre forward. Did this change of personnel change the plan? Of course not. Instead of looking for Rashford in that space, United were now looking Garnacho who knew what to do, as you can see in the image below from the 76th minute mark.

In the sequence above, following this pass, Garnacho manages to get inside the City box but both Akanji and Walker used their superior physicality to defend the situation before the young forward ends up fouling Akanji and conceding a freekick.

Now, after reading all of the above observations of United's tactical plans in and out possession and seeing example after example you may now be thinking 'so what'. None of the above examples actually led to any of the goals.

So let's look quickly at both goals.

In the first image below, taken from just shy of the 77th minute, United are initiating their high press as Man City are trying to play out from the back. Incidentally, this sequence came from City taking the freekick, that Garnacho conceded (the previous instance), short and trying to play through the United high press. The pressure results in Rashford closing down Ake's clearance and the ball going out for a Man City goal kick.

From the resulting goal kick, Man City have decided not to invite any more pressure from United and set-up to go long. See the image below where there is a nice aerial shot of the pitch, neatly showcasing United's 4231 shape too.

Despite City getting the first contact on the ball from the long goal kick, the ball eventually finds its way back to De Gea who then starts a United attack on their right-hand side. Following some interplay on the flank, as you can see below, the ball ends up inside with Casemiro who plays a pass in behind for Rashford. This specific scenario is the action which leads to United's contentious equalising goal.

So whilst not directly involved in the goal itself, United's out of possession set-up, and disruption of City in their build up play, impacted City's decision to go long from the resulting goal kick. And then just over 30 seconds later, the home side were celebrating being back in the game. Albeit, controversially.

If you think my attempt at linking United's tactical plans to their first goal was a stretch, then hopefully you can't argue with their second, and ultimately winning goal. By now, you can probably call it, play-by-play. City are attacking in the final third, United regain possession, the ball gets to Fernandes and without hesitation he makes that pass in behind into the inside left channel where Garnacho is making the inevitable run.

After getting control of the ball, Garnacho gets a slice of luck as his first cross gets rebounded back to him off the face off Akanji, but once back in possession of the ball, he does well to beat Ake and put a pass into the 6-yard box where, despite Man City having four players close by, nobody is goal side, so Rashford has a tap in to score.

United may have rode their luck in this game, both in general play and especially with their first goal. But in his post-match interview ten Hag referenced that he was delighted with the result and performance. He said that to get a result against the likes of Manchester City, in addition to needing to "suffer" at times, you also need to be really "good out of possession" and that's what his team were (his words). He also stated needing the "right organisation", the "right intensity", being "proactive" and once in possession needing to play in the "right spaces" and "breaking well". United certainly did all of that in the derby. But then again, that was the plan all along wasn't it.

Now that we've covered Man United's tactical plans, let's switch our attention to Man City's tactical solutions.

Manchester City's Tactical Solutions

Manchester City regularly go into games with specific in possession tactical plans depending on the opponent. And this game will likely have been no different. Some early observations of their initial play was their fullbacks staying wide in build up as opposed to inverting and using a base of two central defenders as opposed to trying to form a three like in recent games.

Another noteworthy point was how deep and frequent Haaland was dropping towards the ball. This tactic was a ploy in the reverse fixture at the Etihad earlier in the season so will very likely be an intentional movement. When the Norwegian striker dropped deeper he regularly dragged an opposing central defender up the pitch with him which created a gap in the United backline that others could then exploit. Or even possibly for himself. On a few occasions, after initially going deep, Haaland made surging runs back into advanced areas where he looked to be trying to exploit the gap he himself had created.

Whilst none of his runs were found with passes, one thing that Haaland did contribute by dropping deep was often helping create an overload for City in deep build up which enabled City to help play through at times.

But whilst all of those aspects - and as it's City there will have been lots of other elements not even mentioned - were solutions in someway, the tactical solutions I want focus upon in this section involve - 1) Bernardo Silva dropping deep between the centre backs to help with build up, and 2) finding Kyle Walker, the free-man, before using Kyle Walker, as the free-man.

As detailed in Manchester United's out of possession section, their tactical plans, amongst other things, involved limiting use of Rodri in City's build up.

As mentioned, according to Erik ten Hag, Rodri is the key player. So therefore with United deploying Eriksen (and Martial) to get close to Rodri at all times, it meant that City were required to find an alternate solution (player) in their build up.

Up-step Bernardo Silva. From around the 10th minute onwards, Bernardo Silva began dropping into the City backline in deep possession to get on the ball. This movement and positioning of Silva had multiple of advantages.

Firstly, once he dropped, he was often free and therefore able to receive passes from the goalkeeper or central defenders, and then start making passes, giving City an element of control against United's previously active high-to-mid block. Whilst Casemiro was tracking Silva when he was playing as a midfield 8, when Silva became an auxiliary centre back, the Brazillian didn't want to know, instead choosing to remain, and cover, in central areas for this team.

Secondly, Silva dropping allowed Akanji and Ake to push a little wider which had the knock-on effect of stretching the United forward line wider too - making it harder for them to remain narrow as a unit and therefore maintain compact distances needed for their press.

Thirdly, Silva's regular positioning and influence on the game resulted in drawing out a United opponent which due to their man-orientated responsibilities meant that a teammate would then be free.

Below are a number of examples of Bernardo Silva dropping between the two central defenders to help give City a solution to their issues in build.

In this first example in the 12th minute, Silva has dropped back and as you can see, Casemiro is nowhere to be seen so Silva is able to carry the ball and find a passing angle through the United high block.

Another example in the 13th minute.

In the next example from the 20th minute, you can see how Silva is beginning to have an impact and find passes through their block, on this occasion into Walker, who like Cancelo, was regularly the free players for City in their build up. Also note in the image below how Casemiro is now marking space and zones as opposed to covering a man like he would be doing if Silva was in his initial position of the left-sided midfield 8.

The next image below picks up the action from the above where you can see Walker has inverted into the space to receive a pass from Silva and then carry the ball upfield. (This example is a spoiler about City's second major tactical solution, but more on that shortly).

Here's another example of Silva dropping between his central defenders and in front of the United block in the 23rd minute...

...and again, is able to carry the ball forward unattended and find a pass into the free-man Walker out wide on the right-hand side. Silva is unattended as the United forward line were each under specific instructions on their roles but this did not involve or anticipate Silva becoming a third central defender.

In the final example, a minute later, again, Silva drops deeper between the two central defenders as he's continually getting joy for his team by aiding their build up and finding a solution to United's attempt at disrupting this phase of play.

The next tactical solution of City's has already been touched up multiple times in this post. It involves Kyle Walker being the free-man and how Man City went about firstly finding him and then using him as a key weapon in their attacking play.

In regards to initially finding him. As already referenced, in the early stages of the game, it was clear that due to United's out of possession set-up, both City fullbacks would often be the free players for them to pass to, if they could find the angle. And whilst Cancelo was used at times, City focused their build up play via their right-hand side so a lot of focus was put on Kyle Walker.

In similar images to ones you've seen above, below you can see how Walker circled is free in space behind the first two lines of United's defence after Rashford presses inside towards Akanki...

...after receiving the pass, Walker carries the ball upfield and due to all other United players being man-orientated he is able to progress possession into the final third before attracting an opponent, on this occasion Fred, which then frees up De Bruyne in more space but Walker misplaces a simple pass inside and the attack breaks down. Also see how this attack has also drawn Casemiro over to that side of the pitch too which consequently is leaving Bernardo Silva unattended in the left half-space (bottom of the image).

We've already seen how Bernardo Silva could drop between the two central defenders to help City find Walker in their build up but another way was De Bruyne dropping for a vertical pass from Akanki and then playing out to Walker on the touchline who can then again carry up the pitch.

In an example from later in the first half, Walker begins to invert more centrally, often coming in on the blindside of Rashford. In the situation below, Walker's inverted movement catches Rashford's attention and he gets drawn narrow which creates a passing angle for Akanji into Mahrez who has dropped short on the right wing. But that's not the end of attack...

...with Walker being on the inside and still free, he continues advancing forward with an underlapping run which impacts United by occupying Malacia from going out to engage Mahrez which means Fred has to vacate De Bruyne to go and close down. In this situation, Mahrez misplaces his pass into De Bruyne and United regain possession.

In the final example of the first half, and a good demonstration of City realising that Walker was not only the free-man but he could become a dangerous weapon in their attacks, Ake has possession at the back. See how Walker is already beginning to invert, on the blindside of Rashford...

...Man City continue to build possession on their left-hand side before seeing Walker, who has continued to come inside, in acres of space. He receives the ball and then due to how much room he has, decides to take a shot which narrowly drifts wide of the post.

Now in the first half, City seemed more focused on finding Kyle Walker as it helped with their build up. It was only on certain occasions, and more specifically towards the end of the first 45 where Man City began to try and weaponise Kyle Walker being the free-man. This changed in the second half.

In the image below, taken from the first couple of minutes of the second half, you can see Walker already beginning to take up a much more, aggressive, inverted central midfield position.

A minute later, again, in the image below, Walker makes a sharp move to come inside from his initial wider starting position to receive a pass through the lines from Akanji. Another key feature of this example, and others pending, is De Bruyne's slightly deeper positioning. This looked to be intentional as it had the consequence of dragging Fred up and therefore gave United one less opponent to defend and push up to Walker when he progressed up the pitch from these sorts of areas.

In the next image below, you can see how this sequence has developed. Walker has carried the ball into the final third and as Fred was dragged up the pitch, Casemiro needs to come over to engage Walker and this creates space for Bernardo Silva in the left half-space who Walker passes to before the Portuguese international takes a shot on goal but it gets blocked and the ball squirms its way onto De Gea.

In another example from a minute later, Walker's constant inverted positioning is causing United more problems. This time, Eriksen, originally tasked with staying near to Rodri, is forced to check his shoulder and drop deeper to cover Walker as 1) free and 2) proving to become an issue.

In this final image of this set of examples, again, in the 55th minute Walker is beginning to make an aggressive movement inside, on the blindside of Rashford. De Bruyne, who has again pulled up Fred with him, actually points in Walker's direction for Akanji to play the pass but he instead chooses a different option.

Now like the end of the Man United tactical plan section, after reading all of the detail and seeing the screengrabs from the game, you may be thinking so what. What does this have to do with anything.

Well, much like how United's tactical plans had contributing factor in their goals, this finding and using of Kyle Walker had a impact on Man City taking the lead. And up until the contentious equaliser, was a big factor in City's overall dominance in the game.

A minute before the goal, in the image below, you can see again Walker taking up an inverted position in central midfield. As always, he is on the blindside of Rashford

Man City work possession over to their left-hand side and then Cancelo begins carrying infield. The image below is where the action picks up and here you can see Walker (circled), as usual, in lots of space with no one ahead of him.

Cancelo plays the pass out to Mahrez on the right wing who then plays inside to Walker as he's free. These two then combine again before Mahrez switches the point of attack by passing into Rodri in central midfield who then aims a pass out to the left wing. Eventually, United manage to get a foot on the ball and momentarily clear.

However, City are able to sustain the pressure and just over a minute later, the ball again finds its way out to Mahrez. Now due to Walker's previous high position, he is in a good area to impact play. Walker's presence in this area of the pitch has helped create an overload situation and his decoy run on the blindside Malacia (who has pushed out wide to engage Mahrez) means Fred needs to track Walker's run. This therefore vacates De Bruyne who is now making a run into the space that Fred is vacting. Mahrez sees the run and plays the pass inside the area to De Bruyne...

...once inside the area, De Bruyne gets to the byline, basically unopposed apart from Casemiro trailing behind him, and then he stands up a cross to the far post which Grealish greets to head City into a 1-0, and deserved lead.

Whilst Kyle Walker did not directly touch the ball in the immediate play leading up to the goal, his influence was massive. And it had been growing.

In the opening stages of the game, City were trying to find Walker to help with their build up play. He was often holding a wider position to help provide angles for City to play out from in their own third. This was their first solution for him, finding him.

But due to United's man-orientated system, City soon realised that Walker could offer much more than just an escape from United's high block, by inverting him more they realised he soon could be the solution to breaking the deadlock.

Both managers were quoted after the game stating their satisfaction with their team's performance. And I think both genuinely will have been.

The home team had a clear tactical plan and the away side were problem solving in-game, finding multiple solutions to the issues and disruption United's plans were trying to cause them.

It was an interesting tactical battle. That unfortunately will be remembered and talked about more for an contentious goal as opposed to the actual story of the game.

Thank you for reading this tactical story.

All stats used in this post were obtained from Whoscored.com and game screengrabs were captured from BT Sport.