Line-Ups
Newcastle United (NU): in-possession 343 & out-of-possession 541
Chelsea (CHE): in-possession 433 / 235 & out-of-possession 433
More details on each team's shape, in and out of possession, and general observations below.
Newcastle United Observations
In-Possession:
NU did not have much possession during the game (29% overall), and it was even lower in the first half (22%)
When NU were in-possession, they would switch from their deep 541 out-of-possession shape into a 343 shape with both wingbacks pushing higher upfield to help build / support the attack
On the few scenarios in which NU did have a controlled spell of possession, NU wingbacks were afforded space by CHE, as CHE's fullbacks were both occupied by NU's wide forwards, Saint-Maximin and Murphy
(Also, CHE's wide forwards tended to stay higher up the pitch out-of-possession so would not track NU's wingbacks when they moved up the pitch - possibly to exploit the space the wingbacks vacated in the event of a turnover)
Murphy on the right flank would tend to hold his width and position himself / attack CHE left back on the outside
Whereas Saint-Maximin would tend to carry the ball inside and attack CHE backline through the centre of the pitch to try and a) create a shooting opportunity for himself or b) draw out a CHE centre back and then find a pass in-behind for a teammate running into the vacated space
Saint-Maximin would initially position himself on the outside of CHE right back so that when he received the ball he could attack on the inside
Joelington's role was to occupy CHE's centre backs
He would do this via a) making runs in behind the defence to stretch CHE backline towards their own goal, thus creating space infront of the defence for Saint-Maximin in particular to run into, b) try and win aerial duels which NU's wide forwards could run onto / compete for second balls and c) get into the box for crosses from out wide
Hayden and Longstaff would tend to back-up NU's attacks so able to support play by offering a pass backwards to recycle possession - but they were mainly positioned to protect NU from CHE counter attacks (as CHE left three players higher, NU had 5 back so not to get outnumbered)
The below visual show NU's basic attacking movements versus CHE's general out-of-possession shape - here you can see the sort of the space NU's wingbacks were afforded when NU had possession
CHE seemed comfortable to allow this space, possibly for a combination of these reasons a) they wanted Ziyech and Werner to exploit this space following a turnover, b) the wingbacks did not have enough quality to cause them too many problems, so the full backs prioritised NU's wide forwards, as mentioned above, and/or c) NU rarely had enough possession for this scenario to become too much of an issue that they needed to rectify
In the first half, NU actively got into a deep 541 low block out-of-possession and sat off CHE rarely pressurising the player on the ball in either CHE's build up or middle third possession
This appeared to be an intended tactic, presumably for two reasons - 1) they did not want to push up too high and leave space in behind for CHE attackers (Werner in particular) to exploit and 2) it was an attempt to draw CHE up the pitch and then attack the space in behind using the pace of Saint-Maximin and Murphy
However, this tactic only proved to backfire, as it resulted in CHE being easily able to get and sustain possession in the final third and therefore squeeze up the pitch to pin NU in their own third
As a result, Murphy and Saint-Maximin were both so deep in their starting positions following a turnover that they were easily counter pressed by CHE thus preventing any counter attacking opportunities
Joelington would also drop deep in the low block and therefore also unable to provide an out ball and even when he could, he had no players near him so would easily concede possession
In the second half, NU pressed CHE more regularly and higher up the pitch which did help NU gain more possession (38% possession second half compared to 21% possession first half)
This tactical tweak prevented CHE having such comfortable possession and, more importantly, stopped CHE entering and easily maintaining possession in the final third and therefore pinning NU in their own half (this helped NU's counter attacking opportunities as Murphy, Saint-Maximin and Joelington would be higher up the pitch following turnovers)
However, whilst this second half tactical tweak out-of-possession resulted in NU having more of the ball it also resulted in there being more space for CHE to exploit in attack which ultimately helped CHE score their second goal of the game to help seal the win
Out-of-Possession:
As mentioned, without the ball NU got into a 541 shape
In the first half, NU predominantly got into a low block and did not pressure CHE when building up and it was very passive pressure in the middle third too, as they looked to deny CHE space between-the-lines
As mentioned above, this low block tactic appeared to be intentional, presumably for two reasons - 1) they did not want to push up too high and leave space in behind for CHE attackers (Werner in particular) to exploit and 2) it was an attempt to draw CHE up the pitch and then attack the space in behind using the pace of Saint-Maximin and Murphy
In the second half, NU's defended higher up the pitch when CHE had possession in their own third and middle third with their wingbacks pressing CHE fullbacks when in deeper possession - when one wingback would press, the other on the opposite side would drop to give NU a back four
NU's wide forwards also changed their position out-of-possession in the second half and were higher and narrower to try and block passing angles into CHE's midfield
When CHE did progress possession into the final third, NU reverted to their 541 low block shape
As mentioned above, whilst this tactical tweak denied CHE having as much controlled possession in the second half it did make NU more vulnerable to specific attacks on the outside of their wide centre backs which CHE tried and did exploit
See notes and visuals in the CHE In-Possession section for the problems NU's out-of-possession tactics caused in both the first and second half
Chelsea Observations
In-Possession:
As explained above, in the first half NU got into a 541 low block so CHE were afforded time and space to build up and play through the thirds of the pitch
CHE's typical attacking movements at the back were that the centre backs would split and drop a bit deeper to make it difficult for Joelington to even attempt to press
CHE fullbacks would hug the touchline in their own third and as CHE progressed the ball up the pitch they would push higher too - James on the right flank would tend to sit a little deeper in the final third so he could angle himself for clip crosses into the box for Abraham, Werner, Mount and Chilwell to attack towards the far post
Kante would be CHE's midfield pivot and look to play passes out wide to the full backs or lay off to Mount or Kovacic who would be positioned more in their respective half spaces and drop to receive the ball
When CHE had possession in their own third or middle third, Mount and Kovacic would push up higher and position themselves behind NU's midfield four, often in the space behind and between the central midfielder and wide midfielders i.e. between-the-lines (the space between the opposition defence and midfield lines)
Mount and Kovacic took up these positions as it a) helped pin NU midfield from pressing e.g. if a NU midfielder did press ahead then they would leave either CHE player in space infront of the NU defence which would then inevitably require a NU defender to jump out of their backline, thus creating space for CHE to exploit behind NU defence and therefore be closer to goal, and b) if CHE could find either player in a pocket of space between-the-lines, then again, a NU defender would be forced to either jump out of position to pressure and as a result leave space behind them that can be exploited or stay in position and allow the CHE player to have a free shot on goal
As mentioned above, when CHE had sustained possession in the final third, Mount and Kovacic would drop a little deeper nearer Kante and using their passing ability and ball carrying ability to try and break through NU's low block
Werner and Ziyech also had varied roles in attack depending on what area of the pitch CHE had possession
When CHE had deeper possession, both Werner and Ziyech would initially pull out wider - in Werner's case, on the left flank he tended to position himself between NU's right wingback and right-sided centre back and in Ziyech's case, on the right flank he tended to position himself on the outside of NU's left wingback
Assumed rationale for this, was Werner, more of an off-ball runner, he wanted to attack the space in the right channel in behind NU's defence, so if the ball was on the opposite side of the pitch he could use his pace to cut across the right wingback and run on the blindside of the right centre back for diagonal passes
Whereas for Ziyech, more of a ball carrier, he could receive the ball in a wide position and then carry the ball infield which a) created space on the outside for James to run into and receive the ball as the NU left wingback could be dragged out of position to follow Ziyech infield too and b) allowed him to come inside on his preferred left foot to either shoot, put in an in-swinging cross or find a diagonal through ball pass
However, as CHE progressed the ball into the final third, both Ziyech and Werner would tend to invert and be positioned more infield which allowed space on the outside for James and Chilwell to attack
Abraham played a traditional number nine role in the game and his main roles were to get into the box and be positioned between the goalposts to try and capitalise on CHE's varied attacking tactics and also at times try and play quick one-touch combinations with a player making a forward run e.g. Ziyech carrying the ball infield, Abraham showing to feet and trying to play a one-two to get Ziyech in-behind NU backline
As detailed above, in the first half, NU sat in a 541 low block which a) allowed CHE lots of possession in the final third so they therefore needed various attacking tactics to try and beat NU's low block and b) it allowed them to squeeze up the pitch into NU's half and pin NU in their own half, as any loss of possession could easily be counter pressed
The below visual gives an example of CHE attacking in the final third and the type of movements each player would make - this also shows how high CHE centre backs would push up into NU's half to be able to counter press and therefore recycle possession to sustain attacks
In the second half, however, CHE were able to attack NU in a different way
Again, as explained above, NU tweaked their out-of-possession tactics in the second half and defended higher up the pitch when CHE had deeper possession
This included NU's wingbacks pressuring CHE's fullbacks when in possession which resulted in NU being left 3v3 at the back
Whilst this tactic meant both Ziyech and Werner both had more space to attack the space on the outside of NU's wide centre backs, CHE often deployed a different tactic to exploit this space (as even if the CHE forward made that run, they would easily be tracked by their wide centre back and then the attack slowed down which helped NU get back into their 541 low block shape)
Instead of Ziyech and Werner always making that run into the space a NU wingback would vacate when pressing a CHE fullback, they would instead come infield (and as a result pin their wide centre back infield) and then CHE wide central midfielders (Mount and Kovacic) would make the channel run from deep
This tactic was used quite often by CHE, it had an element of surprise, as it was a deep runner so difficult to track (would a NU central midfielder track or would a NU wide centre back drop and leave their man in the middle) and also, the runner would less likely be caught offside
This tactic often resulted in a NU wide centre back going out to press the central midfielder who had made the run into the channel and then the NU defence would need to all shift over one to cover - this at times gave CHE a 2v1 opportunity on that side of the pitch if the wide forward then followed the play out and made a run between the wide centre back and middle centre back
The below visual gives an example of this tactic - 1) a fullback would receive the ball, 2) Ziyech would push infield and then 3) Kovacic would make a run into the vacated channel for a pass from James (the same would happen on the left flank with Mount making the channel run)
Out-of-Possession:
In the first half, CHE had 78% possession so were not required to get into their out-of-possession shape too often but when they did it was a 433
Ziyech and Werner would both tend to stay high and central out-of-possession
This resulted in NU's wingbacks often being afforded space to carry the ball forward / time on the ball in wide areas, but if they progressed the ball into dangerous areas (i.e. final third), CHE's wide central midfielders would shuttle across to close down
CHE's main defensive tactic in the first half was keeping possession and sustaining attacks in NU's final third
As NU sat in a 541 low block, CHE backline (two centre backs) would push up high into NU's half and then alongside Kante were in good positions to counter press the ball on any turnovers which fell NU's way - this really helped CHE pin NU into their own third
In the second half, NU had more possession, as they began to defend higher up the pitch, plus, CHE were content to sit in a mid-block as it allowed NU to come higher up pitch and then left more space for CHE to exploit on turnovers
CHE other main defensive actions were when Saint-Maximin received the ball, as he's a good, direct carrier of the ball at speed
However, as Saint-Maximin prefers to dribble the ball infield, this played into CHE's defensive shape as he would often run into a congested central area with James tracking him, the central midfielders dropping and even a centre back jumping out if required
Result
Half-Time = 0-1
Full-Time = 0-2
Thank you for reading.
Stats used in this piece were obtained from WhoScored.com
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