Line-Ups
PSG: in-possession shape varied in build up / final third & out-of-possession 4231 (high) / 442 (mid) / 4411 (low)
Man City: in-possession shape varied in build up / final third & out-of-possession 424 (high) / 433 (mid) / 451 (low)
More details on each team's shape, in and out of possession, and general observations below.
PSG Observations
In-Possession:
PSG varied their in-possession structure depending on what area of the pitch they had the ball
In their build up phase, in the first half in particular, Paredes would drop between the two PSG centre backs
This positional switch from Paredes would trigger a whole host of other movements from the PSG team starting with the two centre backs who would split wider to give the PSG backline a wider coverage of the pitch in-possession
This then allowed the PSG fullbacks to push wider and higher up the pitch, especially Florenzi on the right flank
With the fullbacks providing PSG's width, it meant that Di Maria and Neymar would come infield into the right and left half-space pockets respectively
Another key positional change that happened (intentionally) when Paredes dropped to make a back three was Verratti rolling out from his advanced central midfield position into a left-sided central midfielder, specifically into spaces that Bernardo Silva vacated following Man City's high press
This positioning of Verratti caused Bernardo Silva (and Man City as a whole) issues as he seemed unsure as to whether to go and press, as Man City clearly set out to do in a 424 high block shape, or stay deeper to deny Verratti too much space (more on the issues this caused Man City in their out-of-possession section and how they tried to solve this)
From PSG's perspective, this switch in shape in their build up helped give them multiple benefits which are described in detail below but first see a visual example of how this shape looked following the aforementioned positional switches
The benefits these positional switches gave PSG in their build up play were that it gave them multiple passing options, it helped them get numerical advantages, it confused and disrupted both Man City's high and mid-blocks, it helped draw out the Man City high press - thus creating space in behind to exploit, and also, higher up the pitch, it helped pin the Man City back four so they could not push up and plug in gaps that appeared ahead of them, which subsequently helped PSG maintain their numerical advantages, especially in central areas
Whilst Man City's mid-block shape would be 433, with Bernardo Silva positioned deeper in the lane between De Bruyne and Mahrez to protect right-sided central areas of the pitch (as per the shape in the line-ups graphic at the start of this post), in their high block Bernardo Silva would push up to make a 424 shape
The Man City high block would often be triggered by a PSG backwards pass or movement towards their own goal, therefore Paredes dropping back in between the two centre backs would help trigger Bernardo Silva to jump out of his deeper position to initiate Man City's 424 high-press - this subsequently vacated space in-behind this Man City frontline of four and left Rodri and Gundogan to cover central areas of the pitch
By having an extra player in their backline, PSG had five players versus Man City's frontline of four, plus, they had Gueye as the single pivot in front, able to make angles for passes through this first line of the City press
However, Paredes was not simply an extra body to give PSG a numerical advantage, his passing ability was used from these deeper areas to start / build PSG possession / attacks - from here he could clip passes to the fullbacks in space and try and find forward passes through-the-lines into advanced players
A key tactic of PSG in these build up positional switches was to try and get Verratti (main target) and Di Maria (secondary and decoy target) in space, on the outside of (Verratti) and/or in behind (Di Maria) the two Man City central midfielders, to receive passes, through-the-lines from the PSG backline
Verratti appeared to be the main target of this tactic, as he was the player they looked for and passed to most from these situations, plus, he was in more space as he would a) drop into the area of the pitch that Bernardo Silva vacated - this looked to be a pre-planned tactic with the movements he was making and b) pull wider left so that Rodri was reluctant to follow him out as he would therefore leave gaps in central areas where passes could have been made directly into the PSG forward line
Whilst not intended to be conclusive evidence merely indicative, the below touch map from Whoscored.com shows Verratti's touches over the whole game and roughly half of his touches (circled) all congregate in this left-sided central area of the pitch
Di Maria, who as mentioned would come infield from a wide right position, would also be an option for PSG to play forward to
As he was positioned on the outside of and in-behind Gundogan who was predominantly focused on jumping up to engage Gueye if he received the ball, Di Maria could receive passes from back but as he was being closely tracked by Cancelo it would be a risker pass option
Also, Di Maria's positioning and movement appeared (to me at least) to potentially be a decoy tactic from PSG (more on this shortly)
PSG were able to get Verratti, in particular, in space with the positioning and movements of Neymar
As mentioned, Neymar was part of the wider PSG positional switch when Paredes dropped into the backline as he would come infield into central and left-half spaces
Now, a couple of logical reasons for this is 1) PSG were able to get one of their more creative, dangerous players into central areas and 2) it freed up space in the left channel for Bakker to advance into
But another reason, and I suspect intentional as opposed to a fortunate consequence, is that Neymar coming infield could help pin Walker and prevent him from going to engage further up the pitch (e.g. towards Verratti) as this would leave Man City 2v2 at the back with their two centre backs being left to deal with Neymar and Mbappe (it at least gave Man City a decision make / problem to solve)
Below is a visual example of how PSG's positional switches enabled them to get numerical advantages in their build up play, the areas Verratti and Di Maria would position themselves and how the Man City backline would get pinned
All PSG's positional switches in this build up tactic were intentionally choregraphed to disrupt and beat Man City's anticipated high block shape and press
As mentioned, whilst PSG did on occasions try to find Di Maria in the right half-spaces from the back, his positioning also looked to be a slight decoy tactic from PSG
PSG would not only use Verratti to help build and play through-the-thirds on the left-hand side of the pitch, but they also looked to intentionally build possession via their left-hand side to draw the Man City team across the pitch and then hit a switch of play to the right flank where Florenzi would be high, wide and in plenty of space on the Man City weak side
As you can see in the visual above, Cancelo would have two players to cover on his side following PSG's positional switches, Di Maria and Florenzi
Throughout the first half, Cancelo seemed to prioritise covering Di Maria, whether because he / a player in this area was deemed the higher threat or that's who Cancelo was tasked with covering before the game (possibly as they expected him to play wide right, on the outside of Cancelo)
Whatever the reasoning, this decision allowed Florenzi in space on the right-flank and PSG tried to exploit by building up play from the back via their left-hand side in an attempt to draw over the Man City defensive shape and then hit diagonal switches to the right wing for Florenzi to receive and then attack down the touchline deep into the final third
Whilst the tactics described above were not the only tactics PSG used in their build up play, they were the most frequent and effective in helping PSG progress possession up the pitch into the middle and most importantly final third
When PSG where in more advanced areas of the pitch, their in-possession structure continued to morph
In middle-third possession, after beating Man City's high block and forcing them into their mid-block shape, Paredes would push up back into a double pivot role and Verratti could also come inside into more central areas (see visual below) to combine and interchange with Neymar, Di Maria and Mbappe, all of whom were very fluid with their positioning
In the final third, PSG resembled more of a 226 - but worth noting that this was not a flat front six, in central areas it was very fluid, with lots of interchanges between the four central players (Verratti, Di Maria, Neymar and Mbappe) who would aim to play / rotate between different vertical and horizontal lines
To help visualise this final third shape, see below
In the final third, Florenzi and Bakker would tend to both get high and be PSG's widest players, but they could also rotate inside if one of the central four wanted to come out wide
In central areas, the four aforementioned players would regularly interchange, and all would aim to get into the box from crossing situations (if not the ones crossing)
Getting numbers into the box seemed to be a clear tactic of PSG's as in addition to the four central players, the fullbacks could also get into the box
The vast majority of PSG's attacking play happened in the first half (albeit Man City eventually seemed to find better solutions out-of-possession from 30 minutes onwards) and all of the above build up and final third, possession and attacking tactics, were from examples of what PSG did in open play
However, in the first half, PSG created a number of their shots and their goal as a result of their set-pieces, specifically their corners
PSG had a clear tactic of using in-swinging corners and getting bodies in and into the six-yard box to attack the ball
Below are some screengrabs of these in-swinging corner situations from the game to help demonstrate the tactic
In this first example, the right-footed Neymar is taking a corner from left-hand side and his in-swinging cross ends up at the far post with Mbappe but still within the six-yard box and whilst not the intention from this situation PSG managed to create two shooting opportunities - the first after the ball gets laid back to Florenzi on the edge of the box for a shot which gets blocked but PSG manage to keep the ball live and work another opportunity via some good combination play with Neymar and Verratti which ends up with Neymar having a shot thats gets blocked and deflected over the bar for another corner
In this second example, the left-footed Di Maria is taking a corner from the right-hand side and swings the ball towards the near post where Marquinhos is running in to meet it inside the six-yard box to head towards the far post and put PSG ahead
In this third example, the right-footed Neymar is again taking a corner on the left-hand side of the pitch, and he swings it towards the near post where Paredes is situated in the six-yard box, and he gets first contact but only manages to direct wide of the near post
In all of the above examples, you can see that PSG have 3/4 players taking up positions inside the six-yard box and then two players (Marquinhos and Kimpembe) starting near the penalty spot and then making runs into / towards the six-yard post
PSG clearly did their homework on Man City's set-up from defensive corners and planned to position their players accordingly and whilst the intention would have been to create goal scoring opportunities, by just flooding the already congested six-yard box they could try and ensure they at least created some chaos in the Man City penalty area which might (and did) lead to some opportunities
Man City would always defend with 10 players back at corners - they had four players inside the six-yard box, two on the edge of the six-yard box line, two players picking up players inside the box, then a player able to follow any short option and a player on the edge of the box
PSG had five corners in total in the first half and as shown above, from these situations they managed to create multiple goal scoring opportunities and also score a goal
As previously mentioned, most of PSGs attacking success came in the first half - they had a higher percentage of possession (46%) compared to the second half (35%) and also generated the vast majority of their total shots in the game (10 shots in total and 9 of these came in the first half)
In the second half, likely as a consequence of protecting their 1-0 lead, PSG were less active without the ball and got into a lower defensive block quicker out-of-possession
This meant PSG therefore had less of the ball and mainly relied on counterattacking opportunities, but this also resulted in PSG not being in advanced areas regularly enough to be able to win corners - in the second half, they only won one corner, so this removed a key attacking threat from PSG
Comparing PSG's touch maps in the first and second halves in the image below you can see that they had nearly 100 less touches in the second half compared to the first but more importantly, you can see the location of these touches was a lot more skewed towards their own half where they were most likely defensive actions as opposed to possession based
Whilst due to the game state of having a 1-0 lead, a more cautious second half approach - and relying on Mbappe for counterattacks - was logical and was also partly enforced by Man City, due to their desire to equalise they were very active without the ball and committed more players forward
But eventually, and arguable inevitably, the Man City dominance resulted in not only an equaliser but also a winning goal to head into the semi-final second leg as 2-1 winners
Albeit as the saying goes, hindsight is a wonderful thing, but PSG will likely look back at this game ruefully and reconsider whether attack could have been the best form of defence in the second half
Especially considering PSG took the lead in the 15th minute of the game and for the rest of the first half they stuck to their in-possession tactics which were proving to be effective - granted Man City created chances in the first half but PSG generated more and of better xG quality
PSG started the game with a clear plan of attack, both in open play and via set-pieces, and they were able to sustain this even when in a 1-0 lead, however, in the second half they chose / were forced to abandon this plan, and this is what cost them the game
Out-of-Possession:
Without the ball, PSG had various defensive structures depending on where Man City had possession
In the first half, when Man City were playing out via their goalkeeper and building up in their own third, PSG would get into a 4231 high block as per the visual below
In this high block, Verratti would pivot off Rodri to help Mbappe put pressure on the Man City centre backs and goalkeeper and try to use his cover shadow to block passes into Rodri
Either side of Verratti and Mbappe would be Neymar and Di Maria who would help put pressure on the ball from the wider areas, both by squeezing infield and also trying to block / cover passes out to the flanks to the Man City fullbacks
Behind these four players would be Gueye and Paredes who would cover central areas, reacting to where the ball went, and then the backline of four who would push up high to help squeeze the pitch and keep their high block shape compact
PSG would trigger their high block at specific moments, including Man City goal kicks, when Man City had possession deep in their own third, backwards passes and any uncertainty or misplaced passes / control of the ball
Once Man City were able to gain control of the ball and/or beat the high press to progress possession into the middle third, PSG would shift their defensive shape into more of a 442 shape with Verratti and Di Maria both dropping either side of the PSG double pivot to become makeshift left and right-sided midfielders respectively - see visual example below
In this mid-block 442 shape, PSG would remain compact, both vertically and horizontally, and prioritised blocking central areas of the pitch as opposed to trying to engage the Man City backline when in possession of the ball
PSG seemed most comfortable to allow Walker time and space on the ball and, on a few occasions, seemed to even allow Walker space to carry the ball infield but this appeared to be a trap as once Walker decided to carry the ball forward in central areas, PSG players quickly swarmed at him from multiple angles to win the ball back (safe to say, Walker opted for a safer passing option after the second failed attempt and by the looks of Guardiola's reaction on the TV replay, following one failed attempt, it seemed he didn't agree with Walker's decision making in the first place)
One issue for PSG in their mid-block shape was that as they prioritised blocking central areas of the pitch, it meant that they left / allowed Man City players space in wide areas
This approach left PSG vulnerable to switches of play and also 2v1 situations against their fullbacks, in particular Bakker at left fullback - but more detail on this is provided in Man City's in-possession section
Once Man City arrived in to the final third, PSG would defend their box in a low block which was more of a 4411 shape with Neymar dropping slightly deeper to support the midfield four (see visual below)
In PSG's low block, there back four would try to remain narrow and cover the width of the box and the midfield four would sit in front of them, trying to deny spaces between-the-lines and shift across the pitch as a unit as Man City tried to work openings from side-to-side
Man City overloads out wide was still an issue for PSG in their low block shape
In both PSG's mid and low blocks, the actual makeup of their midfield four could easily switch - as PSG were very fluid positionally with the ball, when they lost possession, their midfielders might not be able to get back to their usual defensive position so they could therefore each easily fill in for each other, as all knew each other's roles - therefore at times the midfield four could line up as, for example, Gueye, Paredes, Verratti and Di Maria from left-to-right
The majority of what's been described above covered how PSG set-up out-of-possession in the first half of the game and whilst Man City were still able to create chances, PSG's were 1) able to use their mid-block shape to keep Man City's possession ahead of them on the whole and 2) their proactiveness at times without the ball via their high block helped give them a foothold in the game to enforce their own in-possession play and tactics onto Man City
However, in the second half, PSG rarely got into their high block bar a few occasions in the opening stages of the half which Man City helped provoke and nearly benefit from (more on this in the Man City in-possession section)
And PSG even seemed to skip their mid-block shape, instead, predominantly getting into / being forced into their low block shape, sitting a lot deeper in front of their box, trying to remain compact and rarely trying to engage Man City on the ball, only when they got into the final third
See below a Man City touch map comparison between the first and second halves to show how in the first half, PSG denied Man City less play in their own third and area, whereas in the second half, the volume of Man City touches in the PSG half, final third and PSG area increased
As concluded at the end of the PSG in-possession section, there was a sense of inevitability about Man City not only equalising but finding a winning goal in the second half following PSG's willingness to concede territory and the ball - in the second half Man City had 65% possession compared to 54% in the first half
PSG's approach out-of-possession in the second half was not at all illogical, sitting deeper to draw Man City up the pitch and then try to exploit the space in-behind via counterattacks using the pace of Mbappe was a sound plan but PSG conceded so much territory to Man City that they were able to snuff out any counterattacks opportunities at source following turnovers with their high counter press, then recycle possession and sustain their attacking pressure
A team of Man City's quality have proven they will tend to have the majority of the ball and create goal scoring opportunities even against the lowest, and best, of blocks so PSG - who's strengths lie in other areas - only served to allow Man City more of the ball than they probably would have had anyway
Man City Observations
In-Possession:
Man City had various team structures and player movements / interchanges when in-possession
When Man City were playing out from their own third, either via their goal kicks or deep possession, Man City would spread their back four across the pitch and have their double pivot drop towards the backline to provide passing options and angles forward to play through the PSG high block
Ahead of these six players, the Man City forward line would help pin the PSG back four and central midfielders back nearer the halfway line
Foden and Mahrez would stay high and wide to pin the PSG fullbacks and De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva would occupy the pockets of space between the PSG centre backs and double pivot, often on the outside in the half-spaces
If the six Man City players in their own third needed an extra player to help them play out, Bernardo Silva would be the one to drop deeper to offer another passing option
Below is a visual example of the typical Man City shape when trying to play out from the back versus the PSG high block
In the middle third, Man City had a variety of in-possession tactical plans to try and get through, around and over the PSG defensive shape
Their basic structure involved Walker, Stones and Dias at the base but with Walker in the right half-spaces and often on a slightly advanced horizontal line compared to the central defenders
Ahead of this base would be Rodri and Gundogan as the double pivot, and Cancelo who would be wider left towards the touchline
These two lines of Man City's structure would be asymmetrical so Walker would be insight right but hold a deeper position and Cancelo widest left but on a more advanced horizontal line - in central areas, the four other players would often try to play on different vertical lines to provide different passing angles through the PSG shape
The visual example below will hopefully better demonstrate this asymmetrical shape
As mentioned, Cancelo would hold a wide left position and he had license to play on both the Man City middle and front lines of their attacking structure
For example, when Foden was also holding a wide position on the left flank, then Cancelo would sit a bit deeper, nearer the horizontal line of Rodri and Gundogan, but if Foden was coming inside to the left half-space then Cancelo could advance higher and more towards the PSG backline
Another factor in Cancelo's positioning was that by playing slightly deeper and on the outside of Di Maria, he could draw him over which would open up gaps in the PSG midfield four that Man City could exploit
The Man City frontline would be made up of Mahrez who would hold the width on the right flank and stay high up against and on the outside of Bakker, in attempt to either receive the ball in space and/or help stretch out the PSG backline, thus creating gaps within in
Inside of Mahrez would be Bernardo Silva, who like Cancelo, would have license to play on both the Man City middle and front lines of attack
Bernardo Silva could drop inside and wide right, to help Man City progress the ball up the pitch, as there was space in these areas due to Walker's deeper, narrow fullback position
Plus, Bernardo Silva looked to be trying to exploit the spaces around Verratti's narrow, and unfamiliar, defensive position
Another key role of Bernardo's Silva was pushing up against Bakker which helped create overload situations on Man City's right flank - but more on this shortly
Completing the forward line would be De Bruyne who would take a number of different positions, including being Man City's highest central player to occupy the PSG centre backs, he could drop short in between the PSG double pivot, he could pull into the pockets of space in between and in behind Paredes and Di Maria - especially when Cancelo's deeper position helped draw him out wider, and he could regularly interchange positions with Foden - so Foden played more centrally and De Bruyne wider left
De Bruyne's positioning helped Man City create numerical advantages in different areas of the pitch, in particular on the left-hand side - but again, more on this shortly
Man City's in-possession structure, positional play, player movements and interchanges, and patient passing approach were all an attempt to disrupt the PSG mid-block defensive shape
As PSG prioritised trying to block the centre of the pitch and deny spaces between-the-lines, Man City tried to manipulate to then manufacture situations where they could create gaps and spaces within it, specifically between the PSG defence and midfield
One of the noticeable tactics of Man City in the first half was overloading and building up possession via their left-hand side, in an attempt to then switch play to the right wing to manufacture 2v1 or 1v1 situations against the PSG left fullback
Man City would create these left-hand side overloads using Dias, Cancelo, Gundogan, Foden and De Bruyne - see the previously used visual below where you can picture how these players could help give Man City a numerical advantage on the left versus the PSG right-hand side
This left-hand side overload was an attempt to manipulate and draw the PSG defensive shape over to that side of the pitch and then leave the right flank as a target for the switch, either to create a 2v1 or 1v1 situation against Bakker at left fullback
Man City could manufacture 1v1 situations by using the positioning of Mahrez whose high and wide positioning on the right flank often allowed him lots of space when Man City had possession on the opposite side of the pitch and as PSG tried to maintain a compact defensive shape, Bakker would try to stay close to Kimpembe which at times could leave Mahrez in lots of space where Man City could find him with a diagonal switch to the PSG weak side where he could receive the ball and attack Bakker 1v1 on the outside or cut inside for a shot or an in swinging cross
Man City would also use Bernardo's Silva positioning to help manufacture 2v1 situations on the right flank
As mentioned, Bernardo Silva could take up advanced positions in the Man City frontline in their middle third possession (refer back to the visual example above) - here he would push up against, and slightly on the inside of, Bakker to pin him and thus free up more space for Mahrez on the outside, Bakker then had more ground to cover to get out to Mahrez when he received the ball
From these situations Mahrez could again attack Bakker 1v1 on the outside or inside, but also, due to Bernardo's Silva's initial high position, there was a passing option in-behind for Silva who would make a run between Bakker and Kimpembe
In the screengrab below (albeit from an unofficial YouTube highlights video) you can see Man City's overload on the left-hand side has shifted the PSG team over to that side of the pitch, Bernardo Silva pinning Bakker and Mahrez in space looking to attacking the space behind - this attack actually ended up coming to nothing as Rodri overhit the pass and it was collected by the goalkeeper, but you can see the intent
Trying to exploit the PSG left fullback was not only a tactic of Man City's in their middle third possession, they also used it in the final third
As Man City progressed into the final third, their shape resembled much more of their usual 235 - with Walker slightly more advanced, Cancelo more infield and Gundogan pushing up to give Man City a frontline of five - see visual example below
In the final third, Man City tried all of the same in-possession tactics as per the middle third, but they particularly tried to use their frontline of five to overload the PSG backline of four - exploiting spaces in between and on the outside
This 5v4 overload was also exploited by Man City at crossing situations where they could at times get a spare man at the far post if a PSG midfielder had not dropped back in time
As mentioned, Man City would also still try to manufacture 2v1 situations against Bakker in the final third
One of the ways they did this was by using Cancelo's position in the deeper left-half space, and the fact that he was right-footed, to make in swinging clipped passes / crosses over the top of Bakker for either Mahrez or Bernardo Silva to attack
In the screengrab below (again, from the unofficial YouTube video), Cancelo is circled with the ball and here you can see he is shaping to make this pass for Bernardo Silva making a run in-behind Bakker - in this image you can also see how Man City's frontline of five would give them an overload against the PSG backline of four
Whilst the above attack also ended up coming to nothing, Bernardo Silva was able to get on the end of the pass but as it was so deep, he could only direct it into the hands of the PSG goalkeeper, but again, it shows Man City's intent and more importantly plan of attack
In the second half, as mentioned in the PSG sections, the home side retreated more into a deeper defensive block, and this allowed Man City more possession which led to more goal scoring opportunities
However, they were also required to manipulate the PSG shape more, interchange more and find new solutions to try and breakdown the low block
One new tactic City used in the second half was at times pushing Walker and Cancelo into more advanced wider areas, often by making overlapping runs from deep to try and disrupt the PSG defence and thus creating space elsewhere which could be exploited
Another key factor in the second half was Man City's counter press, as PSG were so deep it allowed the away side to push up higher into the PSG half so even when there were turnovers, the Man City team were positioned to prevent these counterattacks at source and then they could regain possession and sustain their pressure
A final observation of Man City's in-possession play in the second half was their use of Ederson - now this only happened on two occasions in the opening stages of the half, but seemed to be an intentional tactic
As described in the PSG sections, in the first half PSG tried to engage Man City higher up the pitch, this was often triggered by backwards passes towards the Man City goal
And in the opening stages of the second half, in what I assume was an attempt to draw out the PSG shape, Man City appeared to be intentionally passing backwards to Ederson to invite the PSG high press, with the team dropping as a result - including De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva which in turn also drew out the PSG central defenders and then Ederson would hit a long forward pass in behind the PSG backline where both Mahrez and Foden would be making runs into large vacated areas - see visual example below
Now the above tactic didn't lead to anything, often getting swept up by Navas, but it showed how Man City were faced with a problem in the first half and found a solution at half-time to turn it into an opportunity
Following these couple of situations PSG held off on their high block - so maybe they had intended to play the same out-of-possession in the second half as they did in the first but got spooked early on to the risks - and instead sat in a deeper defensive block
But this allowed Man City more of the ball where they used similar attacking tactics to the first half but as they had more attempts to deploy them, they were eventually rewarded with an equaliser and winning goal which gave them a 2-1 lead going into the semi-final second leg
Out-of-Possession:
Without the ball Man City set out with a clear plan to press PSG high in the early stages of the game
However, as mentioned, PSG's switch in their build up shape of Paredes dropping into the backline and the other positional switches caused Man City major confusion and issues in the first 30 minutes of the game that resulted in them changing their high block structure multiple times within the first half
Man City began the game trying to press in a high block shape of 424 and this involved Bernardo Silva pushing up from his right-sided central midfield position alongside De Bruyne in central areas to put pressure on the PSG backline - see visual below
However, as described in the PSG section above, the home side had a plan and counter for this expected high press and used Verratti in particular to pull out into the spaces Silva vacated in order to help PSG not only beat the press but then receive the ball in space where they could initiate their own attack
In the opening moments of the game, the TV cameras picked up Bernardo Silva clearing confused as who to press and what to do, regularly checking behind his right should aware of Verratti exploiting the area he had just left
Man City's solution to this (between the 5–10-minute mark) was to change their high block shape to a compact 433 as per the visual below - where you can see Bernardo Silva stayed in a deeper position to help cover Verratti
However, as indicated in the visual above, this change in Man City set up, also resulted in PSG tweaking theirs too and instead of dropping so frequently between the central defenders, Paredes could now also hold his double pivot position, and this also resulted in the fullbacks therefore sitting a bit deeper too to offer the PSG centre backs passing options out wide
This switch in Man City's high block therefore solved one problem but it helped create another - PSG were then able to gain more control of the ball and they also found it easier to play out to their fullbacks where they could then advance up the flanks to progress PSG through the thirds
Man City therefore changed their high block again (between the 15–25-minute mark) and seemed to revert back to their 424 shape (or 442 if you prefer) but this time, they were more aggressive across the whole of the pitch with each player having areas and opposition players to cover
As you can see in the visual below, Bernardo Silva would again push up alongside De Bruyne to put press on the PSG backline but behind them to help cover Verratti, both Rodri and Walker would be primed ready to engage if needed
The Man City wide players, Mahrez and Foden, were both tasked with pressing / covering the inside but also ensuring they were in a good position to get out to engage the PSG fullbacks too - this meant that when they ball was on the opposite side of the pitch, they tucked infield slightly so able to react wherever the ball went
The most notable feature of this Man City block was that they were prepared to push up as a team and leave space in behind which could have been exploited but as they were so aggressive across the pitch and then team shifted across to support the press and each other, they managed to begin winning back possession, forcing turnovers and therefore getting more control of the ball
Below are some examples using game highlight screengrabs to showcase the success of this new high block shape
In the first image, you can see how Verratti has pulled out to a deep, wide left position, but Man City deal with this by squeezing up and over together as a team whilst they are also covered in central areas and primed ready to engage any switches of play
Above you can see that Verratti has limited passing options as Mahrez (nearest player to him) is blocking the line pass and also any angle into midfield, Bernardo Silva (Man City's highest player) is blocking the inside horizontal pass - and even if he could find that pass, that player is being covered by De Bruyne, at the bottom left of the image you can see Walker and Stones have both pushed up from the backline to keep their shape compact, and finally at the top left of the image you can see Foder who is ready to help any passes infield but also positioned so he's able to squeeze out to the right flank in the event of the switch
Verratti ends up passing back to Navas, the PSG goalkeeper, who immediately gets put under pressure by De Bruyne, and as you can see in the image below, Gundogan has now appeared in the image as he has pushed up centrally and Foden has begun his press out wide to engage Florenzi who is the likely recipient of the next PSG pass
The action picks up the final image below, where Foden's good positioning and pressure helped him intercept Navas' (rushed) pass out to Florenzi and from here Foden carries the ball into the box and towards the byline where he stands up a cross towards the far post which Mahrez meets to head, but PSG manage to clear
In the above image, you can also see more of the Man City team, and also how they fluidly squeeze across and up as a team, ensuring that they are also covered at the back and on their weakside when pressing on the opposite side (see how Walker's body position is now set to dropping deeper and centrally)
In this next example, Man City's improved aggressive high press and block helped generate their best chance of the game (0.29) which they'll be disappointed they didn't score with
In the first image below, PSG are again trying to play out via their left-hand side with Verratti dropping very wide which creates space for Paredes to play vertically into Mbappe who drops short from an advanced area to receive - however, Man City are again dealing with this by squeezing over to that side of the pitch and backing up the press (see Rodri's position - player nearest the PSG player on the touchline) and also Walker's tight tracking of Mbappe (two players circled)
Walker's tight tracking of Mbappe enables him to get a touch of the ball and direct it forwards where it fortunately ends up at the feet of Bernardo Silva, as you can see below
Due to Man City pressing high as a team, they have players in advanced areas to immediately turn defence into attack following high turnovers and Bernardo Silva has a simple pass towards the edge of the area where Foden is making a run to get on the end of it
Foden has a good shooting opportunity (Man City's highest xG of the whole game at 0.29) but despite making a decent connection, it's directed straight at Navas who manages to palm and then reclaim the ball
These examples show how Man City's tweaks out-of-possession were not only used to stop PSG but also helped generate goal scoring opportunities themselves
The post-match stats may show that Man City dominated the ball in this game but the real story in the first half was that in order to do that more, Man City had to find several solutions without the ball to prevent PSG implementing their own attacking plans onto them
Briefly (as broadly covered in the PSG section), Man City's mid-block shape was a very narrow and compact 433 shape, as per the visual below - here Man City tried to block central areas of the pitch to deny the PSG front four, in particular, any spaces between-the-lines
As PSG progressed the ball into the final third, Man City would all drop back as a team with their wide midfielders now deeper to give them more of a 541 shape - even De Bruyne would drop deep to help put pressure on whether PSG had the ball
In the second half, Man City's main defensive threat was a few counterattacking situations from PSG but as already mentioned, they were able to stop these at source the majority of the time using their counter pressing tactics
In summary, the solutions Man City found out-of-possession help them gain more control of the ball and therefore the game which in the end, helped them take the advantage going into the second leg
Result
Half-Time = 1-0
Full-Time = 1-2
Thank you for reading.
Stats used in this piece were obtained from FBRef.com and Whoscored.com and game screengrabs from the BT Sport official YouTube channel.
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